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Summary findings
The recent East Asian financial crisis provides a natural  they find limited support for existing theories of optimal
experiment for investigating foreign exchange risk  hedging. Instead, they find that firms use foreign
management by nonfinancial corporations.  During this  earnings as a substitute for hedging with derivatives. And
period, the financial crisis exposed local firms to large  they find evidence that firms engage in "selective"
depreciations in exchange rates and reduced access to  hedging.
foreign capital.  They investigate the relative performance of hedgers
Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper explore the exchange  during and after the crisis. They find no evidence that
rate hedging practices of firms that hedged exposure to  East Asian firms eliminated their foreign exchange
foreign debt in eight East Asian countries between 1996  exposure by using derivatives. Firms that used derivatives
and 1998.  before the crisis performed just as poorly as nonhedgers
They identify and characterize East Asian companies  during the crisis. After the crisis, firms that hedged
that used foreign currency derivatives, documenting  performed somewhat better than nonhedgers, but this
differences in size, financial characteristics, and exposure  result appears to be explained by a larger post-crisis
to domestic and foreign debt.  currency exposure for hedgers (an exchange rate risk
They investigate the factors important  in the use of  premium), which had limited access to derivatives during
foreign currency derivatives. Unlike studies of U.S. firms,  this period.
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The 1997  East Asian (EA) financial  crisis  is a type of event  that a financial  risk
management  program  is designed  to protect against. For example,  financial  theory suggests  that
hedging exchange  rate risk with financial  derivative  contracts  such as forwards,  swaps,  and
options  can increase  firm value  by reducing  the chance of financial  distress. Prior to the EA
crisis,  many large firms in the region used foreign  currency  derivative  contracts  as protection
against  a depreciation  of domestic  currency. In this analysis  we explore  the efficacy of foreign
exchange  risk  management  during  and following  the currency  crisis. Specifically,  we examine
the exchange  rate hedging practices  of a sample  of EA non-financial  corporations  and investigate
the effect of risk management  on firm performance.
In the Modigliani  and Miller  (1958) paradigm,  the financial  risk management  of a firm  is
irrelevant  to shareholders  that have access to the same risk  management  tools as corporate
managers. However,  more recent theories  suggest  that hedging could be a value-increasing
strategy  for many firmns.  In particular,  the likelihood  of incurring  deadweight  costs associated
with financial  distress  or accessing  extemal capital  markets can be minimized  by following
certain  financial  risk management  strategies  (see, among others,  Smith and Stulz  (1984), Shapiro
and Titman  (1985), and Froot, et al. (1993)). Previous  empirical  research  has also sought  to
identify  which hedging theories  best describe  a firm's choice  to use derivatives. Geczy,  et al.
(1997) examine  currency  hedging activities  of large US-based  corporations  and find that the use
of currency  derivatives  is positively  related to growth  opportunities,  consistent  with the Froot,  et
al. (1993)  theory of hedging.
Our paper extends  this literature  by looking  at a cross-section  of firms during a turbulent
period when risk  management  should  be very valuable. For example,  we examine whether  EA
hedging  policies are consistent  with the findings  for US firms or if other factors motivate  hedging
behavior  in these less developed  economies. Our sample  consists  of 327 of the largest  non-
financial  firms in eight East Asian countries. We study  the risk management  practices  of these
companies  during  a three-year  period (1996-1998)  surrounding  the 1997 currency  crisis.'
Several  facets  of the EA financial  crisis provide  for a unique  natural  experiment. 2 First,
the extreme depreciation  of many regional  currencies  and the ensuing  economic  fallout  are
examples  of the types of risk that might  challenge  the effectiveness  of a risk management
1  In the paper we often use 'hedging' and 'the use of derivatives' interchangeably. However,  we do not
assume  that the use of derivatives  is necessarily  equivalent  to hedging,  but instead,  we provide  tests to
examine  whether  derivatives  are used as a hedging tool. We also explicitly  consider alternative  risk
management  tools besides derivatives.program. Second,  the crisis provides  a brief  but extreme event followed  by a recovery  where
markets  settle to a new equilibrium. This  allows for the examination  of firms' hedging  practices
and performance  pre-crisis,  intra-crisis,  and post-crisis. Third, because  the economies  and
exchange  rates in the region were affected differently  by the crisis, our analysis  can investigate
differences  in institutional  factors and exchange  rate movements  across countries. Finally,  many
firms in emerging  EA countries  have large  foreign  currency  exposures  and growth potential  and
are liquidity  constrained,  making them good candidates  for the type of fiums  that theory suggests
will benefit  most from financial  risk management.
One interesting facet of our study  is the form of the foreign exchange  exposure  of the
typical  firm in our sample. As has been documented  by other studies  (see Harvey and Roper
(1999)  for a summary),  unusually  large amounts  of foreign  debt contributed  significantly  to the
poor financial  performance  of EA firms during  the Asian crisis. 3 This is counter  to the common
use of foreign  debt by US corporations  as a hedge for foreign  exchange  exposure  arising from
foreign  sales or procurement  costs (see,  e.g., Allayannis  and Ofek (1999)). For example,  the
average firm in our sample has a much smaller  percentage  of foreign  sales (19.8% of sales)
compared  to foreign debt (50.3% of sales). In contrast,  for US firms, Geczy  et al. (1997)  find that
foreign  debt  represents  a mere 2.3% of total  assets in a sample of Fortune 500 fimns.
In general, foreign  debt was perceived  as substantially  less costly than local debt in East
Asia because  of differences  in interest  rates. For example,  treasury  manager  T. Duongpom  of
Thailand's CP Intertrade  stated in early 1993,
"The financial markets in Thailand are in the process of changing.
There are more financial  products  in the market. People are borrowing
more in US Dollars and other currencies...  In our case, we borrow in
US Dollars, Yen and Deutschmarks...  The [cost of borrowing]  Baht is
so high that most of us are borrowing  in other currencies,  and once you
do that you have currency  risk."
--Euromoney  Treasury  Management,  Nov. 5, 1993
In fact, some studies  (see,  e.g., Kregel  (1998)  and Pomerleano  (1998))  have attributed  the Asian
crisis in part to the increase  in foreign  debt, which  was encouraged  by the central  banks' policies
2 Since  most of the regions' currencies  were at least loosely pegged  to the US dollar  prior to the crisis, it is
likely  that risk management  programs  were designed  to protect against a currency devaluation  and not
small  exchange  rate movements.
3Harvey  and Roper (1999) suggest  that "corporate  managers levered up their investment  in a period of
declining  performance  in an attempt  to 'bet' on the long-run performance  of their firms and increased  the
stake  by using  foreign currency  denominated  debt; hence, to the extent that foreign debt is left unhedged,
the bet also involves the direction of the country's  exchange rate."
2of pegging the currencies  to the US dollar. Foreign debt was often short-term  and was sometimes
used for imprudent  ventures  (Berkeley  APEC Study  Center, 1998).
Since our sample firms  report the use of currency  derivatives  conditional  on their use of
foreign  debt, we first examine  the factors that determine  the use of foreign  debt. We find a strong
positive  relationship  between foreign  debt usage and committed  capital expenditures  thus
reinforcing  the notion that firms are using foreign  debt as a source  of funding. We also find  that
firms' use of foreign  debt is positively  related  to the percent of foreign  cash, suggesting  that firms
are better able to use foreign  debt if they have some reserves  in foreign  currency. Most
importantly,  CP Intertrade's story illustrated  above is also confirmed  in our data: East Asian  firms
are more likely  to borrow  abroad  when the interest rate differential  between the local rate and
LIBOR  is high.  4
Next, we examine  the extent  of foreign debt hedged  with foreign  currency  derivatives
(controlling  for the estimated  probability  that a firm uses foreign  debt) and find strong  evidence
that firms  use foreign  earnings  before interest and taxes (EBIT)  as a substitute  for hedging  with
derivatives.5  Contrary  to theory  and evidence  in the US, a strong  positive association  exists
between  the extent of currency  derivatives  use and profit margin. A probable  explanation  for this
result is that more profitable  companies  with better credit have easier  access to derivative
markets. Also in contrast  to findings  from US firms, we find  only limited evidence  supporting
the Froot,  et al. (1993) theory of hedging,  that firms with low liquidity  but high investment
opportunities  are more likely  to hedge. In addition,  we find no evidence  that size or institutional
ownership  have any impact  on firms' decision  to use derivatives. However,  we find significant
evidence  at the country  level that EA finns engage  in "selective"  hedging (see Stulz  (1996) for a
discussion  of selective  hedging). Specifically,  most firns hedge only a fraction of their foreign
debt with derivatives  and tend to hedge less if the interest-rate  differential  between  the local rate
and LIBOR  is high.
Whereas  previous  research  has examined  the factors  that influence  a firm's decision  to
use derivatives  within an industry  or across industries  within one country, ours is the first study  to
examine the decision  of firms to use derivatives  across several countries. 6 This is interesting,  as it
can potentially  uncover altemative,  country-specific  institutional  factors,  not previously  explored.
Specifically,  our data spans eight East Asian countries  - Hong Kong and China,  Indonesia,
Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and Thailand  - which differ in their institutional
4Kim  and Stulz  (1988)  suggest  that firms may be able to exploit  temporary  finance opportunities  and issue
bonds in the market where interest costs are lowest.
5  For a discussion  of altemative  risk management  practices see, Geczy,  Minton,  and Schrand  (2000).
3frameworks  and stage  of economic  and financial  development. This allows  us to differentiate
between  firm, industry,  and country  characteristics  that influence  a firm's decision  to use
derivatives  to protect  against currency  exposure! A surprising  result from this analysis  is that,
despite  wide variation  in derivative  usage rates and market  liquidity  across  countries,  much of the
variation  is explained  by firm-specific  variables. We have examined  many country  and currency
specific factors  (such as creditor rights,  legal origin,  derivative  market size and depth, etc.) and
find that, with  the exception  of the interest  rate differential,  these variables  do not (marginally)
explain differences  in hedging behavior. The only exception  is Philippine  firms, which  tend to
hedge significantly  less than similar  firms in the region, possibly  due to lower liquidity  in the
Peso derivatives  market.
A primary focus  of our analysis is the examination  of hedgers' performance  during  and
after the Asian crisis. Our data on the hedging  practices of EA firms amidst the crisis allows  us to
examine  the usefulness  of derivatives  for managing  risk during  a major financial  shock.
Specifically,  we use measures  of financial  performance,  equity  returns, and exchange  rate
sensitivity  to directly  test for the effectiveness  of currency  derivative  use in insulating firns from
the unanticipated  currency  fluctuations  during and after 1997.
First, we examine the differences  in stock market  performance  and equity  risk factors. In
univariate  tests, we find no significant  difference  between  the stock performance  of hedgers and
nonhedgers  during  the crisis. After the crisis, hedgers  perform somewhat  better than nonhedgers.
This differential  performance  is not related  to firms' domestic  equity  betas. Instead,  hedgers
appear to have greater sensitivity  to exchange  rates post-crisis. We conjecture  and find
supporting  evidence  that, on average,  hedgers had a difficult  time maintaining  their derivative
hedges  during  and immediately  following  the crisis due in part to derivative  market  illiquidity  and
credit constraints. This in tum seems  to explain the greater  exchange  rate exposure  post-crisis.
The increased  exposure  combined  with stabilization,  and in several  cases, rebound of the local
currency  (i.e., good news), probably  lead to the relative outperformance  of hedgers.
Multivariate  tests of performance  also indicate  that the use of derivatives  had a weak
impact on equity  retums. However,  altemative  means of hedging such as foreign  EBIT had a
positive  and significant  effect on equity  returns. Not surprisingly,  we find foreign  debt levels  to
be strongly  negatively  related  to both equity  and financial  performance  during  the crisis. Finally,
the evidence  indicates  that economic  and business  risks, as measured  by changes in sales,
profitability,  and growth opportunities,  are important  determinants  for equity  returns.
6 Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) examines differences in the use of derivatives between US and German
firms.
7Our  sample for Hong Kong includes "red-chip"  firms operating in China.
4In our final test we examine  potential  differences  in performance  between  hedgers  and
nonhedgers  using several alternative  performance  measures  such as interest  coverage  and market-
to-book  ratios. Given the large number  of corporations  that experienced  financial  distress  at the
same time, we devise tests that examine differences  in the cross-section  of firms. For example,
32% of the firms in our sample  have interest coverage  ratios less than 1.0  in fiscal  year 1998.
However,  we find no evidence  that finns in the region improve  their performance  using
derivatives  - in fact, hedgers' performance  is statistically  indistinguishable  from that of
nonhedgers.5
Overall,  it appears that hedgers  used derivatives  to reduce their exchange  rate exposures
to levels  on par with nonhedgers. This supports  the hypothesis  that there is an optimal  amount  of
financial  risk a firm should  bear as opposed  to the view that firms always  benefit  from further
reductions  in financial  risk. However,  hedgers may have underestimated  the effectiveness  of
derivatives  as a long-term  risk management  strategy. The fact that foreign  currency  derivatives
users are actually  more sensitive  to changes in foreign  exchange  rates after the crisis suggests  that
hedging  with derivatives  backfired  when market  liquidity  dried  up in 1997  and 1998.9
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows: Section  2 describes  the East Asian
currency  crisis and the characteristics  of the firrns in our sample that use foreign  currency
derivatives. Section  3 examines  the determinants  of the decision  to use foreign  debt as well as the
decision  to hedge using foreign  currency  derivatives. Section  4 presents tests of the relation
between  the use of derivatives  and firm performance. Section  5 concludes.
2  The East Asian Crisis and Data on Non-financial Corporations
2.1  The Currency Crisis in East Asia
During  the first half of the 1990s,  East Asian finns underwent  rapid investment  in fixed
assets (see,  e.g., Pomerleano  (1998)). On average,  internally  generated  funds were not sufficient
for financing  this expansion,  and as a result,  most firns depended on external financing. In
general,  new equity  was used less than debt,  often because stock markets  were perceived  as
under-performing,  and insiders  preferred  to retain management  control of their companies.
Consequently,  domestic  and foreign  borrowing  and measures  of firms' financial  leverage
increased  significantly  in the years up to 1996. For example,  prior to the crisis in 1996,  the
average  listed  firm in South  Korea and Thailand  had a debt-to-equity  ratio of 3.5 and 2.3
8 See Allayannis  and Weston (2001)  for evidence  on US  firms.
9 Although  hedgers were unable to rollover  their derivatives  positions,  anecdotal evidence  suggests  that
outstanding  contracts were honored  by counterparties.
5respectively,  relative to ratios in the US and Germany  of 1.1 and 1.5,  respectively.' 0 Furthermore,
much of the debt was short-term  and denominated  in foreign  currency. Because  of their large
foreign  currency  denominated  debt,  EA firms were harshly exposed  to falls in Asian currencies
against  the US dollar  (USD) and worsening  macroeconomic  conditions. CQrsetti,  et al. (1998)
find an indication  of financial  fragility,  the ratio of short-term  extemal  liabilities  to foreign
reserves,  was above 100%  in Thailand,  Indonesia,  and Korea.
The EA financial  crisis is an unusual  event in economic  and exchange  rate history. As
late as one year prior to the crisis most equity  and foreign  exchange  markets showed  little sign of
the impending  calamnity.  Table 1 shows  exchange  rate volatility  and equity  market  returns for the
eight EA countries  in our sample. We define  three periods (fixed  for all countries)  that describe
the general state of markets:  Pre-crisis  (June 29, 1996  to June 27, 1997),  intra-crisis  (June 28,
1997  to June 26, 1998), and post-crisis  (June 27, 1998  to June 25, 1999)."  Panel A shows  annual
exchange  rate volatility  (as measured  by the standard  deviation  of weekly  percent changes in
exchange  rates versus  the USD)  by country  for each of the three periods. Panel B shows  equity
returns for the major market  index in each country  (see the Appendix  for details).
In the pre-crisis  period, exchange  rate volatility  is very low across  the region, averaging
only 2.7%. For no country  does pre-crisis  exchange  rate volatility  exceed  that of the Japanese
Yen (against  the USD). Equity  returns  in the region were mixed, but only  Thailand and South
Korea showed  a decline  of more than 20%.
On July 2, 1997,  the Bank of Thailand  announced  a managed  float of the Baht and called
on the International  Monetary  Fund for "technical  assistance." This announcement  effectively
devalued  the Baht  by about 20% and is considered  a trigger for the East Asian crisis. (See
http://www.stem.nyu.edul-nroubini/  for a detailed  timeline of the Asian  crisis.) Figure 1 shows a
plot of USD exchange  rates from July 1996 to July 1999. Soon after the Baht depreciation,  other
EA currencies  followed. By the end of 1997,  the Thai Baht (THB), Malaysian  Ringgit (MYR),
Indonesian  Rupiah (IND),  South  Korean Won (KRW),  and Philippine  Peso (PHP) were all down
more than 30% against  the USD; the Singapore  Dollar (SGD), and Taiwan Dollar (TWD) were
each down about 15%. Only Hong Kong and China were able to maintain  a stable  exchange  rate
against the USD. Table 1 shows  that during this crisis period, exchange  rate volatilities  increase
10  For a detailed  discussion  of corporate  debt in East Asia see Claessens,  Djankov,  and Ferri (1999).
" Because  all countries  were not struck simultaneously,  these  dates are somewhat  arbitrary. However,  this
interval  classification  includes  all of the significant  exchange  rate depreciation  in the "crisis" period.
Furthermore  each period  is one year long,  which facilitates  the use of annual  accounting  data in the
subsequent  analysis. The break at the end of June is also convenient  since  it allows  time for the reporting
of the previous year's financial  results.
6more than tenfold  to an average  of 35.  1% and equity  markets  across  the region slumped  an
average of 51.5%.
By the middle  of 1998,  the worst of the currency  crisis  was over; exchange  rates
stabilized,  and equity  markets  started  to rebound. During the following  year (the post-crisis
period),  local currencies  tended to appreciate  somewhat  against the USD.' 2 Exchange  rate
volatilities  moderated averaging  only 15.9% (less than for the Japanese  Yen over the same
period) and equity  markets  in all countries  rebounded  significantly,  up an average of 75.4%.
2.2 Data
Our primary  data source is a set of SBC Warburg  Dillon  Read (SBC-WDR)  equity
reports  from 1997  to 1999,  which report firm's level and mix of debt (short-term,  long-term,
foreign,  and local), the percentage  of foreign  debt that is hedged,  the level of foreign  cash, and the
percentage  of EBIT eamed abroad,  among other items,  for 1996  to 1998. These reports cover
about 40 of the largest exchange-listed  non-bank  firms for each of the eight East Asian
countries.3 Because  these data are not from a conmmercial  vendor  and were often collected
through  direct contact  with the fims  in the sample,  we attempted  to verify the data accuracy  by
searching  through a subset  of firms' annual reports. We selected  hedgers and nonhedgers
alphabetically  from each country  so that we would  have at least five nonhedgers  and the
minimum  of all or five hedgers  from each country. For the 68 firms searched  we find no
reference  to hedging debt with derivatives  for all but one of the non-hedging  furms. Furthermore,
we find only two firms that use derivatives  but do not hedge foreign  debt. For example,
Singapore's  Cycle and Carriage  uses forward  contracts  to manage  foreign currency  liabilities  on
imports  (1997  annual report)  but not foreign  debt exposure. For hedgers, we find specific
references  to derivative  use for all but two firms. This crosschecking  leads us to conclude  that  the
quality  of the hedging data is very good.
We augment  this dataset with  the WorldScope  database,  which provides  additional
balance  sheet  and income statement  data for publicly  traded firms. For firms with data not
available  on WorldScope  we searched  Hoover's Online, WorldVest,  and company annual  reports
(in that order)  to fill in as much missing data as possible. Equity returns  are obtained  from
12 Singapore  showed  a slight  decline,  Hong  Kong  and  China  retained  their  pegs  despite  attacks  by
speculators,  and  Malaysia  instituted  currency  controls.
1 The  reports  do  not  coincide  exactly  with  calendar  or fiscal  years. However,  by cross-referencing
variables  also  available  in the WorldScope  database  it is apparent  that  the data  are most  representative  of
calendar  years  1996  to 1998.  Table  2, discussed  subsequently,  reports  the  number  of firms  from  each
country  for  1996  data. The  exact  set of firms  surveyed  changes  slightly  from  the 1997  to 1998  reports.
The  project  was  curtailed  in  the middle  of the data  collection  stage  for 1998  data  so many  of the firms  have
missing  observations  for  this  year.
7DataStrearn. For companies  not in DataStream  we obtained  price data from the listing  exchange
or company  websites when available. Data for some additional  variables  (for example,  foreign
sales,  family affiliation,  number  of shareholders,  etc.) are obtained  from the Asian Company
Handbook  and Claessens  et al. (2000). Detailed definitions  of all variables  are provided  in the
Appendix. Our final dataset  has data for nearly  all companies. Specifically,  we have,  at a
minimum,  basic  accounting  data and equity  return data for 1996-97  for 320 of the 327 firms in
the 1997  SBC-WDR  report. Basic 1998  accounting  data are available  for 303 of the 327 firms.
Given  the widespread  financial  distress  in EA during  the sample period,  we are also
concemed  with  potential  survivorship  bias. Surprisingly,  only eight firms exited the sample
because  of a change  in organization  from 1996  to 1998. We conjecture  that the generally  large
size of the firms in the SBC-WDR  reports  results  in a lower proportion  of the firms in our sample
(as compared  to all publicly  traded EA firms)  being forced to merge or liquidate. Of the eight
firms, four merged with other firms,  three went bankrupt,  and one was nationalized.  Two of the
eight firms were hedgers,  roughly the same percentage  as in the overall  sample (21.5%). Given
these facts,  we are confident  that the performance  results  are not tainted by a significant  survival
bias.
3  Determinants of Exchange Rate Risk Management
One contribution  of this study  is that we are the first  to provide  a detailed  description  of
derivative  and foreign  debt use by East Asian  non-financial  corporations. While  the focus of this
paper is not on foreign  debt issuance  (or capital structure  decisions),  we provide some evidence
on foreign  debt usage since  the use of derivatives  by our sample firms is conditional  on the
existence  of foreign  debt. 14
3.1  The Decision to Use Foreign Debt
3.1.1 Univariate Results
In our entire sample of 327 firms,  202 (61.8%)  use foreign  debt in 1996  (167 out of 292
excluding Korean  firms). Table 2 reports  summary statistics  for foreign debt users  and non-users
by country.  '5  As most of these statistics  are raw (i.e., do not take into account  differences  in
14  See Kedia  and Mozumdar  (1999) for a detailed  investigation  of the determinants  of foreign  debt issuance
in a sample of large US multinationals.
15  We do not have data on the currency  denomination  of the foreign debt. Anecdotal  evidence  suggests
that the majority  of foreign  debt was denominated  in US dollars and the remaining  part in "strong"
currencies  such as the Japanese  Yen or the Deutschmark. It is therefore safe to assume that the vast
majority of the foreign debt assumed by EA firms was exposed  to currency risk and to a potential
depreciation  of the local currencies  against these currencies.
8country  or industry averages)  we discuss  them here briefly and defer  a more detailed  discussion
to the multivariate  analysis. Usage  rates vary considerably  between  countries  from a low of
29.3% (12 out of 41) for Malaysian  firms to 100%  (35 out of 35) for South  Korean firms. For
foreign  debt users, there is also variation  in the percentage  of total debt that is foreign; 14.8% of
foreign  debt users  have less  than 20% of their total debt abroad  and 10.9%  have all of their debt
abroad. However,  this dispersion  is not explained  just by home country. In all countries,  foreign
debt users have an average of more than 30% of their debt denominated  in foreign  currency.
Overall  though, the percentage  of foreign  debt is the highest  among firms within the middle
income countries  (68.1%).16
Although  the statistics  on Table 2 should  be used with caution when comparing  firms
across  countries,  several  pattems emerge that allow us to put forth hypotheses  for the average
firm in the region. For example,  we hypothesize  that larger  firms would  be able to access foreign
debt markets  more easily  or are more likely to have a relationship  with a foreign  bank than
smaller  firms. Indeed,  as shown  on Table 2, foreign debt users tend to be larger  than non-users  as
measured  by sales. As noted already,  two explanations  often cited for foreign debt issuance  by
EA firms are (1) that local debt markets are insufficiently  deep (i.e., tapped out) and (2) that
foreign  debt is cheaper.' 
7 The first  explanation  suggests  that foreign  debt is a complement  to
local debt and the second  a substitute. As shown  in Table 2, foreign  debt issuers  have higher
levels  of overall  debt (as measured  by the debt-to-asset  ratio' 8) in all countries,  suggesting  that
foreign  debt usage is in addition  to local debt usage.
We hypothesize  that cash flows in a foreign currency  would  increase  the foreign  debt
capacity  of EA firms since  this would  tend to lower the exchange  rate risk for companies  (and
thereby decrease  credit risk for lenders). Likewise,  foreign cash  reserves could act as collateral
for borrowing. The evidence  from these univariate  tests appears  to support  these arguments;
foreign debt issuers  tend to have higher  levels of foreign  EBIT and cash reserves.' 9 However,
these results  vary considerably  from country  to country.
Next, we consider gross margin, a measure of operating  profitability  defined  as EBIT
divided  by total sales. A firm with a higher gross margin could  more easily  make interest
16 Middle income countries, as defined by IMF, include Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand.
17 See, for example, "The  Overseas Option," AsiaRISK,  February  1997, p. 19.
18 We use debt-to-assets  instead of debt-to-equity  because market value of equity is extremely volatile
during our sample period as compared to total asset values.  Consequently,  debt-to-assets  better captures
variation in leverage due to changes in the level of debt.
19 We are concerned that higher levels of foreign cash could be from proceeds of foreign bond offerings
that have not been utilized or converted  to local currency.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that since the vast
majority  of the debt was  bank debt, which is likely to be immediately  utilized,  this is not the case.
9payments  and would  therefore  be more likely to use foreign  debt. Alternatively,  more profitable
firms may be able to fund investments  more cost-effectively  with internally  generated  funds
instead  of debt (or foreign  debt if it is a complement  to local debt) suggesting  a negative
relationship  between  gross margin  and the use of foreign  debt. In general, the univariate  results
support  neither  case: there is no consistent  difference  in gross margin between  foreign debt users
and non-users.
For comparison,  Table 2 also reports  mean values for the quick ratio, interest coverage
ratio, and current  ratio, as we will be using these in our subsequent  analysis. Each of these ratios,
which measure  a firm's financial  condition,  tends to be lower for foreign  debt users. Thus, on
average,  companies  with foreign  debt are in overall  weaker  financial  condition  and therefore
more exposed  to financial  distress  caused by adverse  exchange  rate movements.
The growth potential  of firms using foreign debt is also of concern  since risk
management  theory suggests  higher growth potential  firms should  have a greater  incentive  to
hedge. Typically,  higher debt levels are associated  with more  mature  businesses that have more
stable  cash flows and usually  lower growth  potential. In our sample,  foreign  debt users tend to
have lower market-to-book  ratios though not in all countries. Capital  expenditure  (beyond
replacement)  as a percent of sales is also an indicator  of growth  potential  since  these investments
are in essence a type of growth. 20 For foreign debt users capital expenditures on fixed assets such
as buildings  or roads can also act as collateral  that makes foreign  debt access easier. The foreign
debt users in our sample  have higher committed  capital expenditures  over the next 12 months (as
a percent of sales) in all countries  except Singapore.
3.1.2  Multivariate Results
We test the above hypotheses  jointly in a multivariate  setting  by estimating  a two-stage
model. In the first stage, we use a LOGIT specification  to model  the decision  to issue foreign
debt. The dependent  variable is equal to one if the firm uses foreign  debt and zero otherwise. In
the second  stage,  using only those firms that issue foreign  debt, we examine  the extent of foreign
debt use in an OLS specification.  21 We exclude  South Korean  firms from the estimation  since  we
are primarily  concerned  with foreign  debt issuance as it relates  to hedging with derivatives  and
South  Korean firms are, for all practical  purposes,  prohibited  by law from using exchange  rate
20 An additional  proxy for growth  potential  is expenditures  on research and development  (R&D). We do
not include  this variable in our analysis since it is unavailable  for the majority  of our sample firms.
21 Although  specification  tests consistently  select the two-stage  model  (for the reported  and alternative
specifications)  at the 5% confidence  level, we also estimated  a (restricted)  one-stage  version of the model
using a TOBIT specification. Results  are available  from the authors  on request. In general,  the same
10derivatives  to hedge foreign  debt. 22 Also, recall from Table 2 that all South  Korean fimns  used
foreign debt. Excluding  these firms does not change  the qualitative  nature of the results  presented
here.
Given  the focus of our paper and to conserve  space,  we only report  -(in  Table 3)
coefficient  estimates  and standard  errors from a few  alternative  specifications  for the first stage  of
the two-stage  estimation. (We briefly discuss  results for the second stage and tabulated  results
are available  from the authors  upon request.) Column  (1) reports  results on the decision  to issue
foreign debt using  country factors  as explanatory  variables  in addition  to firm-specific  ones
suggested  by theory. In column (2) we substitute  country  factors with a variable  measuring  the
difference  between local interest rates and LIBOR.
As in the univariate  case, larger  firms as measured  by sales are more likely  to have
foreign  debt. 23 We also include  a dummy  variable  equal to one for firms that are listed  on an
exchange  besides  their domestic  market. Our prior is that  this variable should be related to a
firm's access to foreign  debt markets,  however  we do not find  it to be significantly  associated
with foreign  debt issuance. Overall local debt levels,  as measured  by the local debt-to-assets
ratio,  tend to be negatively  related  to the decision  to use foreign  debt. However,  the coefficients
are not uniformnly  significant  across specifications.  This result indicates,  contrary  to the
univariate  results,  that foreign  debt is, if anything,  a substitute  for local debt rather  than a
complement. The maturity structure  of local debt may also be indicative  of the type of borrower
that uses foreign  debt. Consistent  with evidence  from the US, we hypothesize  that borrowers
with lower credit  ratings will tend to borrow shorter-term. If this is the case, the significant
negative  relationship  between  short-term-to-total  local debt suggests  that firmns  with relatively
lower ratings are less likely to use foreign  debt. 24
As noted before,  we expect a positive  relationship  between foreign  debt issuance  and
measures  of foreign  cash flow or cash levels. In support  of this hypothesis,  foreign  cash is a
significant  positive  predictor  of the decision  to use foreign  debt. (Foreign  sales,  used in
altemative  specifications  not reported  here, is also significantly  positively related  to foreign  debt
factors  are significant  but because  of the more  restictive  specification  we cannot separate  factors that
determine  the decision  to use foreign  debt and the decision of how much foreign debt to use.
22 See, "A Game  of Two Halves,"  AsiaRlSK, November  1996,  p. 39, for a detailed  discussion  of derivative
use in South  Korea.
23 This finding  is similar  to Allayannis  and Ofek (1999)  who examine foreign  debt issuance  in a sample  of
large US firms.
24 Since most of the firms in our sample are not rated, it is not practical to use credit ratings  directly.
11use.) Surprisingly,  the percent of EBIT earned abroad is not significantly  associated  with foreign
debt issuance  though the estimated  coefficients  tend to be positive. 25
There  is no evidence  that growth opportunities,  as measured  by the market-to-book  ratio,
are important  in the decision  to issue foreign  debt (in contrast  to the univariate  results). Instead,
the ratio of committed  capital expenditures-to-sales  appears  to capture any contribution  of growth
opportunities.  As in the univariate  analysis,  gross margin is not a significant  predictor  of foreign
debt use and quick ratios are significantly  lower for foreign  debt users. This suggests  that, even
though  foreign  debt may act as a substitute  for local debt, the overall  financial  condition  of EA
foreign  debt users is probably  weak relative  to EA firms that do not use foreign  debt.  26
With a few exceptions,  our results  from second stage  regressions  on the amount of
foreign  debt use are similar  to those explaining  the first-stage  decision  to issue foreign  debt.
First, firm size is not a predictor  of the amount  of foreign  debt. This may be explained  by the low
variation  in size among our generally  large firms. Second,  we find a significant  positive  relation
between  foreign  EBIT and the level of foreign  debt, which again supports  the hypothesis  that
foreign  financial  activity is related to foreign  debt use.
Inspection  of the coefficients  on the country dummy  variables  in column (1) indicates
that Thai and Indonesian  firms tend to be more likely to use foreign  debt than similar  firms from
other  countries  in the region. The extent of foreign debt use (results  not reported)  appears
independent  of a firm's home country, once firm and industry-specific  factors  are considered. As
an alternative  to country  dummies we have used several country  specific  variables  such as
creditor  rights,  judicial efficiency,  legal origin,  GDP per capita, international  country  risk,
percentage  of family-related  businesses,  and foreign  bank presence (results  not reported).
However,  one country-specific  factor, the difference  between  the local country  short-term  interest
rate  and LIBOR,  appears  to be of major importance. The interest  rate differential  is significantly
positively  related to both the probability  of foreign  debt usage and the amount of foreign debt (at
the 1% level in both cases)." As noted before, foreign  debt was perceived  as substantially  less
costly  than local debt because  of differences  in interest  rates. This perceived  benefit increases
with  the interest  rate differential. While some of the other country-specific  variables  are
significantly  different  from zero individually,  none remain significant  when the interest  rate
25 We use foreign  EBIT in our specifications,  given the less consistent  reporting  of foreign  sales in the
segment  data for our sample firms.
26 We obtain similar  results using the Altman (1968)  Z-score  instead of the quick ratio and the local debt
level as a proxy for a firm's probability  of distress.
27 We are confident  in using the local currency  - USD interest rate spread  since BIS (1999)  data shows  that
average  OTC foreign  exchange  derivative  turnover  in the region is on average  97.24  percent denominated
in USD.
12differential  is also included  in the estimation. We show in the next section  that the interest  rate
differential  is also an important  variable for explaining  derivative  use. 28
Many  popular  press accounts  of the Asian crisis noted significant  debt buildup  in specific
industries  such as real estate;  hence we conjecture  that industry  factors  may be important
explanatory  variables  for foreign debt use. Table 3 shows that there is actually little difference
across  industries  once other  factors are considered. 29
Finally,  we note that  the explanatory  power of the regressions  in Table 3 is quite high.
This is reassuring  since it suggests  less chance  of a significant  omitted  variables  bias in our
reported  results. (It is also gratifying  since  we use the inverse  Mills ratio from the LOGIT
estimation  in column (I) in the subsequent  analysis.)
3.2  Hedging Foreign Debt with Derivatives
In this section  we examine  the use of currency  derivatives  by East Asian corporations.
As little is currently  known about the risk management  practices of EA non-financial
corporations,  we begin our analysis  by documenting  the characteristics  of EA derivative  users.
We then test theories  of optimal  risk management  using our sample firms. These theories  break
into two general groups. First, there are theories  examined  in prior research  using other, mainly
US, samples. Our analysis  provides  an out-of-sample  test for these results-although,  as
mentioned  before, several of these theories  may not be as applicable  to firms in less developed
markets. In addition,  our sample  allows us to examine whether country-specific  factors are also
important  in the decision  to use derivatives,  or whether  firm-specific  factors are the main
determinants  of such decision, as prior research asserts.  This is interesting  since little evidence
exists on how determinants  of risk  management  practices  differ among  regions and countries.
More importantly,  in smaller or less developed  markets,  exchange  rate risk is more likely  to be
relevant  to non-financial  corporations;  in this sense East Asia represents  a more natural  choice  of
location to examine exchange  rate hedging practices. 30 Second,  there are theories  that are better
suited to tests  with our sample. For example,  since  foreign  debt gives rise to the primary
28 Results are similar  in alternative  specifications  that include  interest-rate  differentials,  where we de-mean
the remaining  explanatory  variables  by their respective  country  means.
29  We  tried several  different groupings  of SIC codes. We have reported  results where SICs beginning  with
2 and 3, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8 are grouped  together. There are not statistically  different coefficients  for
these  pairs in any of the analysis  in the paper and including  separate  dummy  variables for  each one-digit
SIC  does not change the results. We choose  these groupings  to minimize  the number  of industry  variables.
30 One drawback  to East Asia is the generally less developed  derivative  markets. However,  with the
exception  of South Korea, which we exclude  from the sample,  derivatives  were readily available  to at least
the larger EA corporate  customers. For more  information  on EA derivative  markets  and common  hedging
strategies  see, "Forex Swaps  in Demand,"  AsiaRJSK,  November 1995,  p. 4, and "Special  FX," AsiaRISK,
October 1997,  p. 28.
13currency  exposure  for EA firms, our data provide  a clean measure  of direct exchange  rate
exposure. Hence, we can use our data on foreign  cash and foreign  EBIT and our multi-country
sample to better investigate  alternatives  to derivatives  that may impact derivative  use.
3.2.1  An Example of an East Asian Hedger
Because  the definition  of hedger  in our sample is in some ways different  than in prior
studies, it is instructive  to consider an example  of a typical  hedging firm. Banpu  Public Company
Limited  of Thailand  is a producer  of coal, industrial  minerals,  and electricity. In 1996,  the
company employed  about 1,300  workers and had 5.67 billion Baht (225 million  USD) in total
revenues,  putting it slightly  below the median firm in our sample in both categories. Banpu has
limited foreign  operations:  It is developing  a coal mine in Indonesia  and has a joint venture for
producing  ball clay in Vietnam. Foreign sales (and  consequently  foreign EBIT)  are negligible.
However,  Banpu  uses a substantial  amount of foreign  debt. For example,  in June 1997  at the
onset of the Asian  crisis, Banpu  had about $310 million  (USD  equivalent)  in long-term  foreign
debt (primarily  convertible  debentures). According  to the 1997  annual report,
"The company had to borrow foreign currencies in funding its
investment, thus becoming more exposed to foreign exchange
fluctuations.  ...  The  company  has  always been  searching  for
low cost funding sources  while controlling  (sic] appropriate  debt
to equity ratio.  The company has a policy to balance timely
foreign exchange  risk coverages and competitive  all-in costs of
funds  to assure acceptable  retums on projects."
Banpu  is also an extensive  user of currency  swaps. Just prior to the crisis (June 1997),
the company  had approximately  162 million  USD (equivalent  notional principal)  in Baht-based
cross-currency  swaps. For exarnple,  the 1997 annual  report notes,
"The  company has  entered into  cross currency swaps  with
financial  institutions  as  the  following:  ...  A  ten-year  cross-
currency swap contract of USD 41.96 million has been swapped
into Baht 1,065.88  million.  The interest rate in USD is 5.95%
per annum when swapped into Thai Baht, interest rate becomes
approximately 8.00%-9.00%  per  annum for  the period from
August 15, 1996  to February 15,  2007..."
Clearly,  Banpu is not using foreign debt as a hedge for existing foreign  currency
exposure  nor, is it using swaps for any purpose other  than hedging the currency  exposure  created
by foreign  debt. In this sense,  Banpu is typical of the "hedgers"  in our sample.
3.2.2  Prior Literature and Hypotheses
14Several  theories of optimal  hedging  strategies  offer us insight into the potential  motives
and benefits  derived  from hedging. For example,  Smith and Stulz  (1985) suggest  that the
transaction  costs of financial  distress  may prompt  firms to undertake  hedging activities. Froot,  et
al. (1993) suggest  firms hedge to reduce  underinvestment  when cash flow is volatile-and  access to
external  financing  is costly. Leland  (1998) shows  that a firm can increase  its debt capacity  (and
consequently  its debt tax shield and value)  by hedging. Similarly,  Stulz (1996) suggests  that
firms hedge to reduce the chance  of costly "lower-tail"  outcomes  thus allowing  firms to substitute
debt for equity.
Empirical  examination  of hedging theories  has been affected by the general  unavailability
of clean data on hedging activities. It is only in the last decade  that corporations  have been
required  to report, in the footnotes  to their annual reports, the notional  amount of derivatives  they
are using. As a result, researchers  have generally  used a dummy  variable  to indicate  a firm's
derivatives  usage in a large cross-section  of firms. Geczy, et al. (1997) examine  currency-
hedging activities  for a sample of US Fortune 500 firms and find that US firms' use of currency
derivatives  is positively  related to the amount  of research  and development  expenditures  (R&D)
and firm size, and negatively  related to a firm's quick ratio.  The authors  also find  a positive
relationship  between  hedging and the interaction  of a firm's long-term  debt ratio and market-to-
book ratio,  which is consistent  with the use of hedging to reduce underinvestment  (e.g., Froot,  et
al. (1993)).31  Graham and Rogers  (2000) find evidence  consistent  with Leland's (1998) theory
that the use of derivatives  allows  firms to increase  their debt capacity,  without  deteriorating  their
credit-worthiness  and therefore  enjoy the resulting  tax benefits.
More recently,  several  papers have examined  the impact  of derivatives  on risk,
investment,  and value. For example,  Guay (1999), Allayannis  and Ofek (1999) and He and Ng
(1998) find  that the use of currency  derivatives  by US and Japanese  firms reduces  their exchange
rate risk. Allayannis  and Mozumdar  (1999) find that the use of currency  derivatives  reduces  the
impact  of cash  flow on investment  (i.e., hedging  allows firms to smooth  their investment)  while
Allayannis  and Weston (2001) find  that the use of currency  derivatives  increases  finm  value.
While Allayannis  and Weston offer evidence  regarding  the benefits  of financial  hedging for a
sample of US multinationals,  this paper is the first to examine the effect of financial  hedging on
31 Tufano  (1996) and Haushalter  (2000)  examined  commodity  hedging activities in a sample  of gold mining
firms and oil and gas producers  and find respectively  evidence  consistent  with theories of managerial  risk-
aversion  (e.g. Stulz  (1984)) and consistent  with theories  of transactions  costs  of financial distress  (e.g.,
Smith  and Stulz  (1985)). Visvanathan  (1998),  among others, examines  interest  rate hedging  and finds
evidence  consistent  with theories  of transaction  costs of financial  distress. Finally,  Mian (1996)
investigates  currency,  interest rate and commodity  derivatives  for a large cross-section  of US firms and
finds strong evidence  of economies  of scale in hedging,  as size is strongly  positively related  to the use of
derivatives.
15performance  across countries  and during a period when it should matter the most. Brown (2001)
describes  currency  hedging at a large US-based  multinational  and finds eamings  smoothing  and
competitive  factors  are the primary  motivators  for risk  management.
In this paper, we examine an additional  theory,  which suggests  that firms engage in
selective  hedging  of their foreign  debt exposure. Specifically,  evidence  in the previous section
(see also Harvey and Roper (1999))  suggests that EA foreign  debt is a type of indirect  speculation
on exchange  rate stability. Local interest  rates in EA countries  were considerably  higher than
equivalent  rates in the US, Europe,  and Japan. By borrowing  in foreign  currencies  EA companies
would be able to significantly  lower their borrowing  costs if the local currency  did not depreciate
significantly. This type of speculation  relates directly  to risk management  with derivatives  since
using derivatives  to hedge the exchange  rate risk eliminates  much of the cost advantage  of foreign
debt. We shed light on this issue  by examining  whether the cost differential  reflected  in the
difference  between  the local interest  rate and the LIBOR is related to the use of currency
derivatives  by East Asian firms. More  specifically,  we examine  whether firms may be less
inclined to use derivatives  when the interest-rate  differential  is high thereby taking  advantage  of
such cost differential. Hence, a negative  relationship  between  the use of derivatives  and interest-
rate differential  may be indicative  of selective  hedging.
3.2.3  Univariate Hedging Results
Table 4 reports  summary  statistics  for hedgers and nonhedgers  by country  for the sub-
sample  of 202 firms with foreign  debt. We exclude South  Korean firms from the remainder  of
this analysis,  since  they were not allowed to (directly)  use derivatives  to hedge foreign  debt.
Across  all countries  42% (70/167)  of foreign  debt users hedge their exchange  rate exposure  with
derivatives. However,  among  the hedgers,  the average  percentage  of foreign debt hedged  is
relatively  high (66.5%)  and less  than 50% only in Taiwan.
For firms subject  to financial  distress costs, hedging exchange  rate risk should increase
foreign  debt capacity  by decreasing  total  firm risk per unit of foreign  borrowing. In support of
this hypothesis,  firms that hedge tend to have higher levels of foreign  debt (65.9% versus 58.7%
as a percent of total debt for all countries). However,  if we instead consider  total debt-to-asset
ratios, then we find no clear pattem. In Hong Kong and Malaysia,  nonhedgers  actually  have
significantly  more total debt than hedgers. These results  differ from Graham and Rogers (2000),
which find a positive relationship  between  hedging and total debt for US firms. This suggests
16that hedging is less important  for determining  overall  debt capacity  but instead  lets firms
substitute  toward  generally  cheaper  foreign  debt. 32
Although  several studies  have found  a positive  relationship  between  firm size and
derivative  use, suggesting  significant  fixed costs for using  derivatives,  we find that only in Hong
Kong are hedgers significantly  larger  than nonhedgers  (as measured  by USD sales). This result
may be due to the size bias inherent  in our sample  of generally  large firms and the tendency  for
larger firns on our sample to be foreign  debt users.
A unique  aspect of our dataset  is our statistics  on foreign  cash and foreign  EBIT. These
two variables  are often  unavailable  for US as well as foreign  firms. Both variables  can play an
important  role in a firm's exchange  rate risk management  decisions. To see this, consider  a firm
with foreign  debt that is not hedged with derivatives. The firm could obtain foreign  currency  to
service the debt from a variety  of sources. First, it might convert  local-currency  denominated
cash into foreign  currency  on an as-needed  basis. In this case, the company  bears 100%  of the
exchange  rate risk. Second,  a firm could use foreign  currency  derived  from foreign  operations
(i.e.,  foreign  EBIT). To the extent that this offsets liabilities  from foreign  debt, foreign EBIT will
act as a hedge and a substitute  for derivatives. Finally,  even if a firm does not receive  cash flows
in foreign  currency,  it could keep cash reserves  (or other liquid  investments)  that are denominated
in a foreign  currency. To the extent  that these reserves  can be used to service foreign  debt,  this
will also act as a simplistic  hedge against  exchange  rate fluctuations  and, again,  as a substitute  for
derivatives.
On the other  hand, if currency  derivatives  are costly,  foreign  EBIT and foreign  cash may
act as complements  to derivatives. For example,  consider  a company  with a low credit  rating or a
company  that resides  in a country  where it is costly to access the currency  derivatives  market
(i.e.,  liquidity  is relatively  low as is the case for several  EA derivative  markets). This company
may have limited access  to derivative  markets  and may not be able to satisfy its exchange  rate
risk management  needs with derivatives. 33
Because  we have data on both foreign  EBIT and foreign  cash, our analysis  can shed light
on whether  foreign  EBIT and cash are used as substitutes  or complements  to derivatives. The
univariate  results  in Table 4 show that for most countries  (and  all countries together)  foreign
EBIT is significantly  lower for hedgers. This supports  the hypothesis  that foreign  EBIT acts as a
32 Recall  that if a firm hedges 100%,  interest expenses will not generally  be lowered  by using foreign  debt.
However, if a firm hedges less than 100%  then it will derive a savings in interest expenses. Also, other
costs of debt (e.g., issuance  costs) may be lower  for foreign  debt.
33 See Petersen  and Thiagarajan  (2000), G6czy,  et al. (2000),  and Opler, et al. (1999) for a more  detailed
discussion  of alternatives  to hedging with  derivatives.
17substitute  for derivatives. For foreign  cash we find the opposite for most individual  countries
(and all countries  together). Foreign  cash  levels are significantly  higher for hedgers in four of
seven countries  and significantly  lower only  in Taiwan. This supports  the hypothesis  that foreign
cash may act as a complement  to hedging  with derivatives. This finding  is not too surprising  if
we consider  the relative costs of obtaining  foreign EBIT and foreign cash. Foreign  EBIT will be
expensive  if it means physically  relocating  operations  abroad. On the other hand, keeping  foreign
cash reserves  incurs only the opportunity  cost of not using the cash for positive  NPV projects.
Foreign cash  may also have the additional  advantage  of lower credit risk since many local
financial  institutions  became financially  distressed  during  the crisis.
Theory also suggests that a firm's competitive  position should  be related  to its risk
management  policy  (see, Allayannis  and Weston  (1999) for empirical  evidence). Specifically,
firms in more competitive  industries  will wish  to hedge more since  they are generally  less
profitable  and therefore  more susceptible  to financial  distress. As before, we use a firn's gross
margin as a measure  of profitability  and industry-level  competition. Surprisingly,  we find that
hedgers  tend to have larger  gross margins than nonhedgers. A possible explanation  is that more
profitable  EA companies  (with less credit risk) are given easier access to the derivatives  market.
As before, we use a firm's market-to-book  value of equity  and committed  capital
expenditures  (divided  by sales) as proxies for growth  opportunities. Recall that theory suggests
finrms  with greater  growth opportunities  will be more likely to hedge. There  is not a consistent
difference  between  hedgers and nonhedgers  in univariate  tests  for either  of these variables.
Hedgers  have a significantly  higher average  market-to-book  ratio only in Taiwan  and Malaysia.
Theory  also suggests  that the more financially  constrained  a firm, the more likely that firm is to
hedge. We use the quick ratio,  interest coverage  ratio, and current  ratio as proxies for liquidity.
In the univariate  tests, there is again  little evidence  of differences  between  hedgers and
nonhedgers.
Overall,  conclusions  from the univariate  tests are not consistent  with similar  results  for
US firms. However,  there may be systematic  differences  across countries  and industries  that
confound  the analysis. Consequently,  we now turn to multivariate  tests of the determinants  of
hedging.
3.2.4 Multivariate Hedging Results
To examine  the determinants  of firms' extent  of hedging,  we use a continuous  dependent
variable,  the percent of total foreign  debt hedged with currency  derivatives  during 1996. Because
18this variable is left-censored  at 0% and right censored  at 100%,  we estimate  TOBIT regressions. 34
Given that  our foreign  currency  derivatives  data is conditional  on foreign  debt use, we include  the
inverse  Mills ratio estimated  in the LOGIT model  of foreign  debt usage mentioned  earlier (Table
3). Table 5 reports  results from several  alternative  TOBIT specifications. Column 1 (2) presents
results without  (with)  controls for industry  and country  factors,  while column  3 includes  country-
specific  interest-rate  differentials  in lieu of country  dummies.
Consistent  with the univariate  tests, foreign EBIT is inversely  related  to hedging with
derivatives  thus supporting  the hypothesis  that it acts as a substitute  for hedging with derivatives.
The positive relationship  between  hedging and foreign  cash holdings  is only significant  when
country  dummies  are not included  in the analysis (column 1). Including  country,  but not industry
dummies  (results  not reported),  also results  in the coefficient  on foreign  cash  becoming
insignificantly  different  from zero. This suggests  that the use of foreign  cash is country-specific
and indirectly  supports the hypothesis  that firms in countries  with less liquid derivative  markets
will use foreign  cash as a complement  to hedging with derivatives.
In contrast  to evidence  from US firms, size is not positively  related to derivative  use.
Again,  we suspect the inherent  sample  bias towards  large firms may account  for this finding,  so
we also consider  finms  listing  on nondomestic  exchanges. We conjecture  that these  firms might
have a closer relationship  with foreign  financial  institutions  that could in turn lead to better access
to derivatives. However,  the coefficient  on the nondomestic  exchange-listing  (dummy)  variable
is not significant.
We find only limited  support  for the under-investment  and financial  distress theories. As
before,  the extent  of hedging does not appear to be related  to levels of total debt (as a percent of
assets)  or foreign debt (as a percent of total debt). In addition,  we generally  find no significant
association  between  hedging and either market-to-book  or committed  capital expenditures.
However,  there is a consistently  significant  negative  relationship  between  hedging and liquidity
as measured  by the quick ratio providing  some support  for financial  distress  theories  of hedging.
Interacting  market-to-book  with debt-to-assets  will help reveal if high-growth  firms that are more
financially  constrained  tend to hedge more. The coefficient  for this term is positive,  as predicted
by theory,  but statistically  insignificant.
The strongest  and most consistently  significant  firm-specific  predictor  of the extent of
derivative  use is a firm's gross margin. Recall that the positive  relationship  is opposite  from what
34 We also estimate a two-stage  approach,  similar  to the one performed  before  regarding  the use of foreign
debt. In the first stage, we examine  the decision  to use derivatives  and in the second  stage the decision  on
the level of derivative  use for those firms that chose  to use derivatives. We obtain similar  results to those
presented  here and we do not include them in the paper for brevity.
19is predicted  by theory. However,  we are very confident  of the validity  of the result-especially
given its persistence  in the multivariate  analysis  and other specifications  we do not report. A
probable  explanation  is that gross margin is a proxy for credit  quality. Since this result is counter
to both  theory and empirical  evidence  from the US, we contacted  derivative  dealers  in East Asia
to further  investigate  the finding. It appears  that there is a close  relationship  between credit
quality  and access to currency  derivatives. Specifically,  dealers estimate  a "fractional
exposure 35" which is similar  to a value-at-risk  number  for currency  derivatives. The fractional
exposure  is then charged  against the available  line of credit for the firm. Consequently,  fimns
with lower available  credit lines  will have less access  to currency  derivatives,  ceteris  paribus. (In
the next section  we discuss how this procedure  was also important  for rolling over hedges  during
the crisis itself.) Other anecdotal  evidence also suggests  that credit quality  is an important
determinant  of derivative  usage in East Asia. 36
The univariate  results  in Tables 4 suggest  that some firms might be more likely to hedge
simply  because  of their home country. Recall, that more  than half of the companies  from
Thailand  hedge whereas  only 17% (4 out of 24) of firms based in the Philippines  hedge. We also
document  significant  variation  in the average  percentage  of foreign  debt hedged across  countries.
Inclusion  of the country  dummnies  in the TOBIT estimation  (column  2) lets us control for
differences  between  countries. Interestingly,  the bulk  of our findings  appear to be firm-specific
rather  than country-specific,  i.e., results  do not change with inclusion  of country dummies.
Interpreting  the coefficients  on the country dummies  suggests  only Philippine  firms use
derivatives  significantly  less (at the 10% level) than similar  firms in other countries  in the region.
We also control for the effect of a firm's primary  industry. Although  we expected  manufacturing
firms to be more  prone to using  derivatives,  we do not find any significant  differences  with  the
other sectors. 37
It is interesting  to cormment  fiurther  on some of the variables that we do not find
significantly  related to the use of derivatives. More specifically,  our finding  that firms in East
Asia do not generally  use derivatives  in a manner that is prescribed  by the Froot,  et al. (1993)
theory of hedging. We explore a variety  of altemative specifications  and variables  that may
35  This is the term used by Chase Manhattan Bank.  Other banks have similar procedures  but different
terms.
36  For more on credit risk in East Asian derivative markets see, "Reading Between the Credit Lines,"
AsiaRlSK,  July 1996, p. 9, and "A Credit Risk Nightmare," AsiaRISK,  December  1999, p. 28.
37  In alternative specifications,  we exclude some explanatory variables that are statistically  insignificant and
strongly related to industry (such as committed capital expenditures, market-to-book,  and debt-to-assets)
and the differences between industries are larger.  For brevity, we report only the weaker findings.
20proxy for the interaction  of liquidity  and investment  opportunity,  such as foreign  EBIT and
market-to-book  or quick ratio and market-to-book,  but none of these variables  are significant.
Hence, the evidence  presented  here regarding  the reasons  behind the use of currency  derivatives
suggests  that East Asian firms may have somewhat  different  risk management  motivations  than
their US counterparts.
The relatively  large number of countries  in our sample  and variation  in country-specific
factors  gives us a unique opportunity  to further  explore  other factors  that may effect  hedging. For
example,  it is possible that companies  that are located  in more developed  countries,  as proxied  by
their GDP  per capita, or have better functioning  capital markets,  as proxied  by legal origin
variables  or total  foreign bank assets, may be more likely  to use derivatives. We have examined  a
large  number  of factors  by replacing  the country dummy  variables  by country-specific  variables
(results  not reported). We find that the following  are significantly  positively  related to derivative
use (at the 5% level or better): English  legal origin 3", international  country  risk, GDP per capita,
creditor  rights,  judicial efficiency,  and derivative  market  trading volume in 1996. The percent of
foreign  bank assets  is negatively  related to derivative  use. Surprisingly,  an estimate  of spreads  in
the local currency  derivatives  market  is not a significant  predictor  of derivative  use nor is the
percentage  of companies  affiliated  with a family  group. However,  we give only passing  mention
of these variables  because  all are dominated  by the interest  rate differential,  i.e., each of these
variables  becomes  insignificantly  different  from zero when the interest  rate differential  is also
included  in the regression. Results for the specification  with the interest  rate differential  are
reported  in the last column of Table 5.
As shown earlier,  one important  motivation  for EA firms to issue foreign  debt was to
reduce their apparent  cost of capital by taking  advantage  of lower interest rates elsewhere  in the
world. If a firm  uses derivatives  to hedge its foreign  debt obligation,  then the cost differential
related  to interest  rates would be eliminated. On the other  hand, leaving this foreign  debt position
unhedged  exposes  firrns  to significant  exchange  rate risk in the event of a depreciation  of the
local currency. The highly significant  and negative coefficient  on the interest rate differential
shows  that many EA firms hedge less with derivatives  when the difference  between  the domestic
short rate and that of the foreign  benchmark  (LIBOR)  is large. Put another way, this suggests  that
EA firms engage  in selective  hedging. Such  behavior, although  apparent  in anecdotal  evidence
and surveys  of US firms (see Bodnar, et al. (1998) and Stulz (1996) for a discussion),  has not
been revealed  in prior statistical  analysis of hedging. This result is confirmed  by our discussions
with derivative  dealers in East Asia. One dealer even recounted  the story of a non-financial
21corporation  in Indonesia  that used derivatives  to add exposure  to the Rupiah in an attempt  to
create zero-cost  debt. (This firm is not in our sample).9
The remaining  factors  in this test appear to have similar  signs and significance  levels as
before with a couple of exceptions. Size, which is now negative  and weakly significant,  indicates
that relatively  smaller firms are more likely to use derivatives-evidence that is consistent  with
Wamer's (1977) theory. 40 The probability  of issuing foreign  debt (inverse  Mills ratio) is now
significant  and positive suggesting  that factors  related to foreign debt usage are also related to
derivative  usage.
We examine one other possible  factor effecting  use of derivatives:  family  affiliation.
Numerous  other researchers  have found  family affiliation  to be an important  factor for corporate
decisions  in East Asia. 4'  We hypothesize  that family affiliation  could have two  opposing effects
on derivative  use. First, firms that are part of a family  may have easier access  to derivatives  or
risk management  advice through  their family  relationships  thus making them more likely to use
derivatives. In contrast,  it may be that family-related  firms believe  they have an implicit hedge
against financial  distress from parent  (or related)  firms and therefore  are less likely  to use
derivatives. We use a dummy  variable  that is equal to one if a firm is a member  of a corporate
family and examine  the explanatory  power of this variable  in specifications  similar  to those in
Table 5 (results not reported). The coefficient  is consistently  positive  but not significantly
different  from zero. We also interact  the dummny  with other variables  in the analysis such as size
and gross margin and find no consistently  significant  relationship;  hence it appears  that family
relationships  are not an irnportant  determinant  of the extent  of derivative  use.
In conclusion,  we find  that the risk management  practices  of EA firrns  generally  differ
from those in the US and there is evidence  that these companies  engage  in selective  hedging.
4  Hedging and Firm Performance
The most interesting  aspect  of this dataset, as compared  to those used in other studies,  is
the potential  it provides  for examining  how firms perfortned  during  an exchange  rate shock.
Intuitively,  one would  expect that firms hedging their foreign  exchange  exposure  performed
38  Specifically,  Hong Kong, Malaysia,  Singapore  and Thailand  have  English legal origins;  Indonesia  and
the Philippines  have French  legal origins;  and Korea and Taiwan have German  legal origins.
39  Results  are similar  in alternative  specifications  that include interest-rate  differentials,  where we de-mean
the remaining  explanatory  variables  by their respective  country  means.
40  Warner  (1977)  suggests  that smaller  firms have proportionally  higher  bankruptcy  costs than larger firms.
Therefore,  to the extent that hedging reduces  the probability  of bankruptcy,  it is more  beneficial for smaller
than for larger firms. Nance, et al. (1993)  find empirical  evidence  on the use of derivatives  consistent  with
Warner's theory.
22better than firns that did not hedge. Some anecdotal  evidence  suggests  this to be true. 42
Alternatively,  hedgers could be using derivatives  because  they have a larger  pre-hedging
exchange  rate exposure. Therefore,  the hedgers  might not perform  better, or might even perform
worse,  during the crisis than nonhedgers.
We undertake  two general  types of tests. First we look at equity returns. We find  no
difference  in returns  between  hedgers  and nonhedgers  during  the crisis, but hedgers  slightly
outperformn  nonhedgers  post-crisis. Interestingly,  this differential  performance  appears  related  to
exchange  rates but not directly  to hedging with derivatives. The second  set of tests uses
accounting  measures  of performance. In these tests we again  find that hedging with derivatives
does not appear to have benefited  EA corporations. We also consider  foreign  EBIT and foreign
cash and examine whether these  factors acted as effective  exchange  rate hedges.
Table 6 shows  the relative  market  performance  of hedgers versus  nonhedgers  by country
during  and after the exchange  rate crisis. The reported values  are differences  in median equity
returns  between  hedgers and nonhedgers. Significance  is measured  by a nonparameteric
(Wilcoxon)  difference  in samples test. 43 During the crisis equity  returns for hedgers are not
significantly  different than returns  for nonhedgers  in any country. On average,  the difference  is
close to zero (2.2%). Post-crisis,  the story is somewhat  different:  hedgers  tend to outperform
nonhedgers  and the difference  is more pronounced  in middle-income  countries. Perhaps  not
coincidentally,  these  countries experienced  the worst depreciations  during  the crisis. The return
difference  is fairly large for all countries  together (13.9%)  and significant  at the 5% level. At the
country  level, hedgers outperform  nonhedgers  in all countries  except Singapore  and in Thailand,
but the difference  is statistically  significant  only in the Philippines.
There are several possible  explanations  for these general findings. First, investors  may
not have appreciated  the benefits  of hedging until after the crisis was over and were able to
observe  the superior  financial  performance  of hedgers. Second,  hedgers could be on average
riskier companies,  may in turn have a larger equity  beta, and therefore  may outperform
nonhedgers  during a major market  upswing  such as the post-crisis  period. However,  this suggests
that hedgers  should have performed  worse in the major  market  decline  during the crisis  period. A
third explanation  for the differential  performance  is that hedgers  have a greater  exposure  to
exchange  rate risk only post-crisis,  that exchange  rate risk is a priced risk factor  to these countries
41 See  for  example,  Claessens,  Djankov,  and  Klapper  (2000);  Claessens,  Djankov,  and  Lang  (2000);  and
Hoshi,  Kashyap  and  Scharfstein  (1990).
42 See,  "Lessons  Not  Learned,"  AsiaRlSK,  December  1999,  p. 5.
43 We report medians  instead of means  since single outliers  substantially  alter means  for some  individual
countries.
23after the crisis,  and that the realization  of exchange  rates is favorable  during this period. In
general,  the data support  this last view.
To test the first hypothesis,  that the market  did not realize  the benefits  of hedging with
derivatives  until financial  data were available  post-crisis,  we look ahead to the results  on financial
performance. We find no evidence  that hedging with derivatives  significantly  improved  the
financial  condition  of hedgers. Consequently,  there does not appear to have been any benefit  to
hedging  for the market  to react to, during the crisis or afterwards.
The second  hypothesis  suggests that there is a fundamental  difference  in the riskiness  of
hedgers  that is unrelated  to exchange  rate exposure  or hedging. The middle  part of Table 6 shows
differences  in equity  betas relative  to the local market  index. In none of the countries  are average
equity  betas  higher for hedgers than nonhedgers  either during  or after the crisis. This  may be
because  of estimation  error in the betas. However,  this seems unlikely  since in the multivariate
results shown  in Table 7 equity  betas are a significant  explanatory  variable for equity  returns
during  the crisis (the coefficient  is negative because  markets  were declining  during  this period)
and after the crisis.
Several  pieces  of evidence  point toward  the third hypothesis. First, the last part of Table
6 shows  that  hedgers are significantly  more sensitive  to exchange  rate risk during  the post-crisis
period. Substantial  evidence  indicates  that liquidity  in the foreign  exchange  derivatives  market
dried  up during  the currency  crisis. Several  EA countries  went so far as to discourage  the writing
of derivative  contracts  to deter attacks  by speculators. This drought  persisted into the post-crisis
period.  Consequently,  companies  that had initially  hedged could not easily  rollover  their
derivative  positions  and were left with additional  unhedged  exposure. Bank for International
Settlements  (BIS, 1999)  data shows  that countries  in EA had virtually  no swap  transactions  in
1998  with  maturities  greater  than one year. However,  73% of firms' foreign  debt in these
countries  had a maturity of greater  than one year in 1997. This highlights  the probable  maturity
mnismatch  between  foreign debt and available  derivative  products,  which would expose  firms
unable to rollover  their hedges  during the crisis. Data  on the actual hedging practices  of our
sample  firms are consistent  with this conclusion. For 1997,  we have data on 67 of the 70 firms
that hedged  in 1996:  25 (37.3%)  decreased  their percent  hedged and 7 (10.5%)  increased  their
percent  hedged;  the average  percent of foreign debt hedged  fell from 65.8% to 49.1%. For 1998
44 For  example,  the TMA  Journal,  Sept/Oct  99,  reported:  "During  periods  of extreme  volatility,  liquidity  in
Asian currencies  evaporated,  making the cost of hedging  astronomically  high...  .liquidity dropped  to record
low levels, as indicated  by the widening of the bid-offer spread. For the Rupiah, the spread widened  to 40
percent,  from pre-crisis level of I percent, pointing  to the existence  of a one-sided  market  (as everyone
rushed  to hedge  against the depreciating  Asian currencies)." See also, "Currency  Special Report:  Asia Gets
24we have data on 39 of the 70 firms that hedged  in 1996:  32 (82.1%)  decreased  their percent
hedged  and 3 (7.7%)  increased  their percent  hedged;  the average  percent hedged fell drastically
from 58.6% to 14.9%.
It also seems  likely that exchange  rate risk is a priced risk factor  during this period. It
was widely believed  by market  participants  that further  depreciation  could lead to a spread of the
political  unrest seen in Indonesia  and a further  weakening  of equity  markets. Since derivative
markets  were a less viable alternative  for hedging against exchange  rate movements,  equity  prices
most likely adjusted  to include a risk premium  related  to the chance of additional  currency
declines. 45 Finally,  it is clear that during  this period the depreciation  of currencies  stopped,
exchange  rate volatilities  declined significantly,  and equity markets  rebounded. The combination
of these effects suggests  that  hedgers most likely  outperformed  nonhedgers  in the post-crisis
period  due to an exchange  rate risk premium  and a generally  favorable  exchange  rate realization.
This hypothesis  is further  supported  by the multivariate  tests. In particular,  during  the post-crisis
period exchange  rate sensitivity  is a significant  explanatory  variable for equity  returns  (at the 10%
level). The positive  coefficient  is consistent  with an exchange  rate risk premium.
The multivariate  results  reported  in Table 7 provide a direct test of the impact of hedging
on returns  and generally  support  our conclusions  from the univariate  tests. They also allow us to
consider  other factors that  may impact  returns, such as the alternatives  to hedging with
derivatives. In Tables 7 and 8, we measure  hedging as the notional  value of derivatives  as a
percent of assets  to capture the economic  magnitude  of the amount of hedging. In Table 7, the
coefficient  on this variable is negative  and significant  at the 10% level in column (1) indicating
that hedging was not associated  with better equity  returns during  the crisis. We repeat  the tests
(results not reported) using a hedge dummy  variable,  which equals  one if a firm hedged more
than 50%,  75%, or 90% of their foreign  debt. In none of these alternative  specifications  is
hedging with derivatives  significantly  positively related  to equity  returns. Post-crisis,  hedging
with derivatives  is positively related  to equity  returns  again at the 10% level. These findings are
consistent  with the evidence  indicating  that firms were not able to maintain  their derivative
positions  during  and after the crisis.
The results  reported  in Table 5 suggest  that foreign  EBIT, and to a lesser extent,  foreign
cash, could be alternatives  to hedging  with derivatives. Table 7 shows  that foreign  EBIT is
Older  and Wiser,"  AsiaRISK, October 1999,  p. 23.  Finally,  our discussions  with dealers confirm  the lack of
a liquid currency  derivatives  market  during the cfisis.
45 In the countries  that had devalued  their currencies during  the crisis,  equity returns  were highly correlated
with changes  in exchange  rates during  the post-crisis period. In a recent paper, Gerard andThanyalakpark
(2000)  also find that post-crisis,  currency  volatility  is a significant  component  of increases  in dollar
denominated  return volatility.
25positively  and significantly  related  to equity returns  during  the crisis. 46 This  finding supports  our
earlier finding  that foreign EBIT is a substitute  for derivatives. It is also consistent  with the
anecdotal  evidence  suggesting  firms with foreign  revenues  were better able to weather the crisis.
Post-crisis,  the coefficient  on foreign  EBIT remains positive  but is not significant. Foreign cash
is not significantly  related to equity  returns during  or after the crisis.
We also find that other factors  besides  those related  to hedging  have the expected  sign
and are significantly  associated  with returns during  the crisis. More specifically,  levels  of total
debt (debt-to-assets),  foreign  debt,  and the equity  beta are all strongly  negatively  related  to equity
retuns.  Firm operating  performance  during  the crisis is also very important. Declines  in sales
and gross margins are significantly  related to returns. Finally,  larger firms performed
significantly  better during the crisis while those firms listed on nondomestic  exchanges  fared
somewhat  worse. Overall,  the explanatory  power of the regression  is high (adjusted  P3  = 52.1%).
Taken  as a whole,  we conclude  that there is little, if any, evidence  that the use of
derivatives  leads to higher equity  returns  during  the crisis. However,  the possible  alternative
means of hedging with foreign  EBIT seems to have added value. In addition,  the slight  out-
performance  of hedgers  post-crisis  appears  to be due to the greater  exchange  rate exposure  of the
hedgers (probably  due in part to the inability  to continue  hedging  with derivatives  in this period)
and a lucky turn-around  in equity and currency  markets.
Despite  the evidence  to the contrary,  it is possible that equity  markets  in the region
responded  to non-findamental  factors 47 and that hedging with derivatives  did help the financial
performance  of finns. To investigate  such a possibility,  we examine  the impact  of hedging  on
firms' interest  coverage  and current  ratios, and changes in market  to book ratios.4' First, we use
the change  in interest coverage  pre-crisis  to post-crisis  (FY1  998 minus FYI  996) as a dependent
variable and hedging pre-crisis  (1996) along with other factors  as explanatory  variables. Column
(I) in Table 8 shows  results of estimating  an OLS regression  with  the change in interest coverage
as a continuous  variable. 49 As before, hedging with derivatives  is not a significant  explanatory
variable, suggesting  that hedging  did not preserve firns' financial  condition. This is a striking
46 As with the hedging variable,  we also measure foreign EBIT and foreign cash  as a percent of total assets
in the analysis for Tables  7 and 8.
47 Several  commentators,  including  US Federal Reserve  Chairman Greenspan,  suggested that the crisis was
due at least in part to a "panic" by investors.
48 Note that the market-to-book  ratio is not associated  to hedging in our earlier tests when it was used as an
explanatory  variable of the decision  to hedge.
49 Interest  coverage  takes on extreme values  when interest expenses  are very small; consequently  we set
equal to 10 all values  greater  in magnitude  than 10. Likewise,  we set interest coverage  equal  to zero, if
operating  cash flow is negative. Estimating  model (1) in Table 8 using TOBIT  to account for this
truncation  leads to qualitatively  similar  results.
26result since in the same  regression  foreign  debt (as a percent  of total debt) is the most statistically
powerful  predictor  of changes in interest  coverage-even more so than the total level of debt as
measured  by the debt-to-asset  ratio.
We also include in the analysis foreign  EBIT and foreign  cash as hedging alternatives.
Both variables  have the predicted  positive coefficients,  but none are statistically  significant.
Otherwise,  only the change in sales appears  to explain changes in interest coverage  over  this
period; as we would  expect,  a relatively  greater  change  in sales improves a firms' interest
coverage  ratio.
Other researchers  have used an interest coverage  ratio less  than one as a proxy  for
financial  distress. This  may provide  a cleaner  test of the ability  of hedging to help prevent
financial  distress. Specifically,  the goal of hedging  with derivatives  may not be to generate  a
large interest  coverage  ratio only to provide  enough protection  to avoid financial  distress.
Consequently,  we also define  a binary variable,  which equals  one if interest coverage  in 1998  is
greater  than one and zero otherwise. Column  (2) in Table 8 reports  results from a LOGIT
estimation  with  this binary dependent  variable. The results  from this specification  also show that
firms using derivatives  were not more likely  to avoid financial  distress than finms  that did not use
derivatives. The remainder  of the results are also similar. Again,  foreign EBIT and foreign  cash
have both positive  coefficients  though  in neither case are the coefficients  statistically  significant.
In this specification,  total debt (debt-to-assets)  is significantly  negatively  related to financial
distress  though  the change in sales is no longer significant. Together,  these results suggest  that
the market  out-performance  of hedgers after the crisis is not related to a superior  financial
condition  due to hedging.
We also  try other specifications  not reported  here. For example, we use fiscal  year 1997
instead of 1998  accounting  data. In general, we feel that 1998  data are better because  the full
operating  impact of the crisis is not felt until the latter  half of 1997,  and for most firms, financial
conditions  continue  to deteriorate  in 1998. Nevertheless,  it is possible that hedgers  benefit from
the use of derivatives  in 1997,  but the benefits  are overcome  in 1998  when some hedgers  have a
difficult time  rolling-over  their positions. Repeating  the tests in columns (1) and (2) of Table  8
using 1997  data leads to the same conclusion:  derivatives  were not effective  in relieving  financial
distress. In another  specification,  we use the level of interest  coverage  (continuous  variable)  in
1998  as a dependent  variable. We find  again that hedging with derivatives  does not affect
performance  although  both foreign  EBIT and foreign  cash are positive  and significant  (at the 10%
level), indicating  that they may both have some effectiveness  as alternatives  to derivatives.
27We also use other alternative  measures  of financial  condition,  such as the current ratio, as
the dependent  variable and repeat  the tests in the first two columns  of Table 8. As is the case
with interest  coverage,  we find no significant  benefit  to hedging with derivatives  using both 1997
and 1998  data.
In our final test of the effectiveness  of hedging,  we examine  whether changes in market-
to-book  values are related  to the use of currency  derivatives  by EA finms. Changes  in market-to-
book can proxy for a change in a firm's growth opportunities,  or altematively,  for a change in a
firm's value. (Both interpretations  have been used previously  in the risk management  literature;
see Geczy,  et al. (1997) and Allayannis  and Weston  (2001); see also Lang and Stulz  (1994) for
the use of market-to-book  as a simple  alternative  to Tobin's Q to measure  firm value.) The last
set of results  in Table 8 reports  estimates  from an OLS regression  in which changes  in market-to-
book from 1996 to 1998 (FY1998  minus FY1996)  is the dependent  variable. Again,  we find no
evidence  that hedging leads to higher firm value,  or alternatively  higher growth opportunities.
In general,  this section yields two broad and complimentary  conclusions. First, the
evidence  supports  the hypothesis  that hedgers  are inherently  more exposed  to exchange  rate
fluctuations  than nonhedgers,  and as a result, their underlying  value is more sensitive  to changes
in exchange  rates in the post-crisis  period. This increased  exposure  may be due to the inability  of
hedgers  to completely  rollover  their hedges during  and after the crisis when derivatives  became
prohibitively  expensive. In this sense,  the use of exchange  rate derivatives  is an attempt to
mitigate  currency  risk, and hedging  firms are successful  to the extent that their market and
financial  performance  is nearly indistinguishable  from non-hedging  firms during the crisis. On
the other hand, if the goal of risk management  was to completely  insulate  derivative  users from a
potential  currency  crisis, then EA firms were not successful  as evidenced  by the fact that their
financial  condition  after the crisis is not better than that of nonhedgers. Consequently,  if
currencies  in the region had continued  to depreciate,  it is likely that the hedging firms would have
underperformed  the market. We also speculate  on the impact of selective  hedging  on
performance:  it could be that "under-hedging"  due to selective  hedging (or equivalently  outright
speculation)  is responsible  for the absence of superior  performance  by hedgers. In short, the best
we can say is that managing exchange  rate risk with derivatives  did not make matters
significantly  worse for foreign  debt users during  the crisis.
5  Conclusions
In this study we analyze  the exchange  rate  risk management  practices for a large sample
of East Asian  non-financial  corporations. Our analysis concentrates  on two general questions.
28First,  what firm, country,  and industry  specific  characteristics  determine  the extent to which frms
hedge their currency  exposure  related  to foreign  debt? We document  that hedging with
derivatives  is positively  related to operating  profitability  (probably  a proxy for credit quality)  and
that firms appear to use foreign  cashflow  as a substitute  for hedging with derivatives. In contrast
to empirical  studies  based on US companies,  we find only  weak evidence  that liquidity
constrained  firms with greater  growth opportunities  hedge more. At the country-level,  we find a
powerful  result that suggests  firms selectively  hedge. Specifically,  there is a strong negative
relationship  between  the extent of hedging and the difference  between  local and foreign interest
rates indicating  that firms are less likely to hedge when they perceive that the benefit  from
borrowing  abroad  is high.
The second  question  that we address  concems  the performance  of hedgers during  the
crisis. We find no evidence that  hedgers outperformed  nonhedgers  due to the use of derivatives.
This result,  combined with an apparent  greater  underlying  exposure  to exchange  rates, leads  us to
conclude  that hedgers use derivatives  to reduce their risk to levels  similar  to those of nonhedgers.
However,  during the crisis, the liquidity  in the derivatives  market declined  so dramatically  that
hedgers  had a difficult time maintaining  their positions. Fortunately  for hedgers, currency
markets stabilized  in 1998  preventing  further losses from exchange  rate exposure.
However,  the real lesson  concerning  exchange  rate risk management  may be much larger.
Hedgers  and nonhedgers  alike experienced  massive declines  in market  value  during  the crisis
period. Thus, if exchange  rate risk  management  was an attempt to completely  insulate firm value
from currency  depreciation,  it failed. The use of foreign  currency  derivatives  was selective,  too
narrow in scope, and interrupted  once the crisis began. Consequently,  our research  raises the
bigger question  of whether such hedging  practices can insure  against systemic  currency  crisis.
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32Appendix: Definition of Variables
Much  of the data is acquired  from SBC Warburg  Dillon Reed  from the Valuation
Issues-Reality Check  series published  by the Asian  equity  research  group. The primary  purpose
of the reports  we use is to determine  the foreign  debt exposure  of East Asian corporations. Some
of these data are collected  by direct contact  with the firms  in the sample. The studies' authors
note that,
"We also  highlight  that for Asian corporates  in general disclosure  is poor
and transparency  low.  It is difficult to be confident  as to the level of
hedging of foreign debt that has been undertaken. Where in doubt we
have taken the view to record the debt as still unhedged,  which we think
is an appropriate  and conservative  approach."
The following  reports  variable definitions,  the primary  data source for the variable or its
underlying  factors,  and any other  relevant considerations  for all variables  reported  in one of the
Tables.
Variables:
Committed  Capital  Expenditures  - As reported  by SBC Warburg  Dillon Reed  for the next 12
months. Each value is standardized  by dividing  by Sales as reported  by Worldscope.
Current  Ratio - Data  are from WorldScope. The ratio of current assets  to current liabilities.
Current  assets  and liabilities  are not available  for 22 firms in 1998. 13 of these firms are in
Indonesia  and Taiwan  and 4 are hedgers  in 1996.
Debt-to-Assets  - Total debt in USD as reported SBC  Warburg  Dillon Reed divided  by total assets
in USD as reported  by WorldScope.
Exchange  Rate Sensitivity and Equity  Beta - These values are estimated  coefficients  from weekly
regressions  for each of the three sub-periods. The two independent  variables  are weekly
exchange  rate changes against  the US Dollar (USD) measured  in USD per foreign  currency  unit
(FCU)  and the orthogonalized  equity  index returns. The equity  index returns are orthogonalized
by taking  the residuals  from a regression  of weekly  exchange  rate percent changes on the equity
index returns,  since these  two variables  were highly correlated  during  the crisis and post-crisis
periods. Average  betas are 0.83, 0.94, and 0.88 for the pre-crisis,  intra-crisis,  and post-crisis
periods,  respectively. For all subperiods  combined  the I  O'h percentile  is -0.02 and the 90th
percentile  is 1.67. The exchange  rate data used for Hong Kong I China is an equal-weighted
average  of the USD against  the Thai Baht,  Indonesian Rupiah,  Singapore  Dollar, Taiwan  Dollar,
and South  Korean Won. Since Malaysia  instituted  exchange  controls during  the post-crisis  period
we use this index to calculate  Malaysian  exchange  rate sensitivities  (for only the post-crisis
period).
Exchange  Rate Volatility  - Exchange  rate volatility  is calculated  as the standard  deviation  of
weekly  log-differences  in the USD/FCU  exchange  rate for each of the three sub-periods.
Equity Market  Index Returns - As reported  by DataStream  including  distributions  for primary
local equity  indices:  Hong Kong / China  - Hang Seng Index; Indonesia  - Jakarta Composite;
Malaysia  - KLSE Composite;  Philippines  - PSE Composite;  Singapore  - Strait  Times Index;
South  Korea  - Seoul  Composite;  Thailand  - SET Composite;  Taiwan  - Taiwan  Weighted  Index.
33Family Dummy (%)  - Variable  is set to a value  of 1 (zero  otherwise)  if the company is identified
as affiliated  with a family-related  cross-holding  structure.
Foreign Cash (o) - As reported  by SBC  Warburg Dillon  Reed. Calculated  as the percentage  of
total firm cash held in foreign  currency.
Foreign Cash (% total assets)  - As reported  by SBC Warburg  Dillon Reed. Calculated  as the
percentage  of total assets  as reported  by Worldscope.
Foreign Debt: Short-term  / Total- As reported  by SBC Warburg  Dillon  Reed. Nominal  short-
term (less than 12 month maturity)  foreign  debt divided by nominal  total foreign  debt. Both are
measured  in US Dollars.
Foreign Debt / Total Debt-  As reported  by SBC Warburg  Dillon  Reed. Foreign  debt as
measured  in local currency  divided  by total firm debt calculated  using prevailing  exchange  rates
at the time  of the report.
Foreign Debt-to-Sales  - Foreign debt denominated  in USD as reported  by SBC Warburg  Dillon
Reed  for 1996  divided  by Sales in USD.
Foreign EBIT (%)  - As reported  by SBC  Warburg  Dillon  Reed. The percentage  of total earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT)  earned in foreign  currency.
Foreign EBIT (% total assets)  - Foreign  EBIT (%)  multiplied  by total EBIT (as reported  by
Worldscope)  divided  by total assets  (as reported  by Worldscope).
Foreign Sales (/) - As reported  by the Asian Company  Handbook  for 1996. Many  of the firms
in our sample are not listed in the Asian Company  Handbook. For these firms we collected
geographical  segment  data when available. If a firm did not report geographical  segment  data or
reported  geographical  segment  data for only its home country  we set the variable  equal to zero.
Consequently,  our measure  of foreign sales may underestimate  the actual level of foreign  sales.
Gross  Margin  - Total EBIT as reported  by Worldscope  divided  by Sales.
Hedge (%)  - As reported by SBC Warburg  Dillon  Reed. The percentage  of foreign  debt hedged
with foreign  currency  derivatives.
Hedge (notional  value as a % of total assets)  - Calculated  by taking  the percentage  of foreign
debt hedged  with  foreign currency  derivatives,  Hedge (%), times the total amount  of foreign  debt
in local currency  divided  by total assets  (as reported  by Worldscope).
Hedge (dummy)  - Set to a value of 1  for firms with  Hedge (%/)  not equal to zero  and a value  of
zero otherwise.
Industry  Dummies  - SIC codes are as reported  by WorldScope  for 1996. Dummy  variables  are
set to a value  of one if the first digit of the primary SIC code corresponds  to the respective
dummy  variable.
Interest Coverage- Data are from WorldScope. Calculated  as total EBIT divided  by interest
expense. Because  some firms have very low interest expense  or negative  EBIT we truncate  the
34series  at 0 and 10. For the full sample 14.3%  of observations  are truncated  at 0 and 6.8% are
truncated  at 10.
Interest  Rate Differential  - The difference  between  local lending  rates as reported  by the World
Bank and LIBOR in December 1996.
Local  Debt lAssets - Local debt is from SBC Warburg  Dillon Reed. The sum of short-term  and
long-term  debt denominated  in local currency  divided  by total assets  from WorldScope.
Local Debt: Short-term  / Total- As reported  by SBC  Warburg Dillon  Reed. The ratio of short-
term local currency  debt and total local currency  debt.
Market-to-Book  - Data from WorldScope. Market  Value of Equity divided  by book value  of
common  shareholders'  equity  defined as total assets less  total liabilities  less outstanding  preferred
stock. We truncate  this variable  at 20 due to 3 outlier observations  (0.94%  of sample).
Multiple  Exchange  Listing (dummy)  - Variable  equals I if the firm trades on more than one
exchange  and 0 otherwise.
Nondomestic  Exchange (dummy)  - Variable  equals 1 if the firm trades on an exchange  not in its
home country  and 0 otherwise.
Quick  Ratio - Data are from Worldscope. Calculated  as quick assets divided  by current
liabilities. Quick  assets are defined as cash plus net accounts  receivable.
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Exchange Rate Volatility & Market Returns
Panel A reports  the standard  deviation  of weekly  percent  changes  in foreign  exchange  rates  versus  the USD. Panel  B
reports  average  holding-period  equity  index returns  as reported  by DataStream  for the major  domestic  market  index.
The pre-crisis  period  is from June 29, 1996  to June 27, 1997. The crisis  period  is from June 28, 1997  to June 26, 1998.
The post-crisis  period  is from  June 27, 1998  to June 25, 1999. Each subperiod  contains  52  -weeks.  Middle  Income  and
High Income  are as defined  by the IMF. Aggregates  are equal-weighted  arithmetic  means  of individual  countries. In
Panel A, a separate  aggregation  is reported  for middle  income  currencies  excluding  Malaysia  because  during  the post-
crisis period  Malaysia  instituted  foreign  exchange  controls  at several  exchange-rate  levels thus  making  the reported
value for post-crisis  volatility  (47.8%)  uninformative.
Panel A: Exchange-Rate Volatility
Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Post-Crisis
All Countries  2.7%  35.1%  15.9%
High Income  1.2%  8.4%  4.0%
Hong Kong  0.3%  0.4%  0.2%
Singapore  2.2%  14.6%  6.6%
Taiwan  1.1%  10.3%  5.0%
Middle Income  3.6%  51.1%  23.0%
Middle Income (ex. Malaysia)  3.9%  55.4%  16.8%
Indonesia  2.0%  109.5%  35.9%
Malaysia  2.7%  33.7%  47.8%
Philippines  0.4%  27.7%  8.6%
South Korea  3.9%  50.8%  13.3%
Thailand  9.1%  33.6%  9.3%
memo: Japan  10.0%  14.6%  20.1%
Panel B: Equity Market Index Returns
Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Post-Crisis
All Countries  -6.1%  -51.5%  75.4%
High Income  16.0%  -38.9%  50.2%
Hong Kong  39.8%  -52.8%  48.3%
Singapore  -16.7%  -38.0%  85.1%
Taiwan  24.9%  -25.9%  17.3%
Middle Income  -19.4%  -59.1%  90.6%
Indonesia  14.8%  -55.4%  50.1%
Malaysia  -9.9%  -67.4%  65.9%
Philippines  -18.9%  -44.5%  38.8%
South Korea  -20.1%  -62.8%  192.2%
Thailand  -62.9%  -65.4%  105.8%Table 2
Summary Statistics  (Means) of Sample Firms in East Asia,  1996
This table reports mean values for some of the variables  used in the subsequent  analysis. Finns are separated  by foreign  debt issuers. Data are for 1996. Variables  are defined in detail in the Appendix.
Firms included in the sample  are those identified  by SBC Warburg  Dillon Read as among  the largest in their  respective home  couintries. Aggregate measures  are provided for High Income and Middle
Income countries (as defined  by the IMF) and for all countries. Chinese "Red Chip"  companies are included with Hong  Kong Companies. Asterisks (***,  **, *)  denote statistical significance  at the 1%,
5%, and 10%  level (respectively)  for a two-tailed Wilcoxon  two-sample  test. Asterisks  are placed  next to the  value that is significantly  larger.
Foreign  Obs.  Foreign Debt  Sales  Debt-to-  Foreign  Foreign  Gross  Market-  Commit  Quick  Interest  Current
Debt  / Total Debt  (USD  Assets  EBIT  Cash  Margin  to-Book  CapEx  Ratio  Coverage  Ratio
(%)  millions)  (%)  (%)  (%)  / Sales
All Countries  No  125  0  687.7  0.16  16.7%  3.4%  23.0%  2.93  *'  16.4%  1.62  6.19  '+  2.15
(exel.  South  Korea)  Yes  167  61.7%  1028.1  0.35  *  20.8%  *  15.7%  **,  23.3%  2.37  47.8%/  ~*  1.37  3.16  2.01
High Income  No  75  0  710.7  0.17  24.3%  3.6%  21.8%  2.47  **  19.2%  1.61  6.17  2.17
Yes  67  52.1%  1549.5 *  0.29 oot  26.3%  *  18.2% *'  22.2%  1.90  37.5%  *  1.16  4.18  1.51
Hong Kong/China  No  26  0  593.3  0.17  16.2%  3.7%  32.2%  2.33  28.7%  2.04  6.03  00  2.29
Yes  36  53.1%  1919.7 *00  0.29  *  18.6%  18.9% *  30.2%  1.71  53.7%  *  1.45  3.92  1.59
Singapore  No  25  0  717.9  0.17  25.2%  5.6%  19.2%  2.37  12.0%  1.31  5.86  1.86
Yes  15  62.0%  826.5  0.31  *  42.7%  00  31.4%  '*  15.5%  2.06  9.7%  0.85  5.07  1.37
Taiwan  No  24  0  825.5  0.16  32.0%  1.5%  13.7%  2.73  16.7%  1.48  6.64  *  2.35  *
Yes  16  40.7%  1383.9 *  0.26  *00  28.2%  4.2% *  9.8%  2.20  26.4% t  0.75  3.95  1.44
Middle Income  No  50  0  653.7  0.14  5.3%  3.2%  24.7%  *0  3.61  *o  12.4%  1.64 *0*  6.21 **  2.12  **
(exl. SouthKorea)  Yes  100  68.1%  684.0 *  0.39  ooo  17.2% *  14.1% *0*  24.1%  2.69  54.6%  *o  1.52  2.48  2.36
Indonesia  No  2  0  438.7  0.01  7.5%  32.7%  *  29.7%  3.19  *  29.7%  2.78  5.49  3.16
Yes  38  79.5%  624.3  0.34  *0  19.5%  20.2%  22.3%  2.17  39.2%  1.49  2.50  2.54
Malaysia  No  29  0  976.1  0.14  5.0%  0.0%  24.9%  4.08 *  7.3%  1.43  6.82  *0  1.78
Yes  12  46.1%  1225.9 *  0.38  11.3%  6.4%  *  21.1%  2.92  37.2%  '$  1.28  2.71  1.46
Philippines  No  16  0  174.5  0.19  0.4%  0.0%  23.3%  2.61  21.0%  1.53  4.50  2.29
Yes  24  59.2%  561.3  0.45  *00  12.7% *0  12.1%  00  31.7%  0  3.21  81.8%  *0  1.98  2.69  3.24
South Korea  No  0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Yes  35  34.1%  6875.5  0.49  29.0%  10.0%  8.1%  0.93  11.0%  0.64  1.66  0.98
Thailand  No  3  0  235.8  0.02  33.7%  30.2%  26.6%  4.59  4.0%  3.37  **  10.00  *0  3.86  *
Yes  26  70.0%  634.3  *o  0.41  000  20.7%  10.7%  21.0%  2.85  60.2%  *  1.34  2.14  1.88Table  3
Determinants of Foreign Debt
This  table presents  results  from LOGIT  regressions  using  all sample  firms  except  South  Korean  firms. The
dependent  variable  is equal  to I if the firn has foreign  debt in 1996  (166  of 276 finns). Independent  variables  are
defined  in detail  in the Appendix.  Coefficients  (Coef.)  and standard  errors  (SE) are  reported. Korean  firms  are
excluded  since  these  companies  were forbidden  by law from  using derivatives  to hedge  foreign  debt. Asterisks
(***,  **, *) denote  significance  in a two-tailed  test at the 1%,  5%,  and 10%  level,  respectively.  P-values  are from
Wald  chi-squared  tests  against  a null  of 0.0.
Dependent Variable: Foreign Debt Dummy
(1)  (2)
Variable  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE
Sales (log, USD)  0.577  ***  0.185  0.194 *  0.056
Nondomestic Exchange (Dummy)  0.482  0.463  0.020  0.417
Local Debt/Assets  -1.193  1.292  -3.365 *  1.159
Local Debt: Short-term / Total  -1.898 *  0.542  -1.654 *  0.470
Foreign EBIT (%)  0.938  0.663  0.434  0.578
Foreign Cash(%)  2.475  0.945  3.285 ***  0.904
Market-to-Book  -0.117  0.107  -0.179 *  0.097
Committed  CapEx/Sales  1.518  *  0.641  1.532  **  0.574
Gross Margin  0.433  0.987  0.073  0.864
Quick  Ratio  -0.279  0.087  -0.299  0.074
Control Variables
Interest Rate Differential  15.956 *  4.146
Country Dummies
Hong Kong  / China  -5.982  **  2.723
Singapore  -6.804 *  2.663
Taiwan  -6.939 t  2.757
Indonesia  -2.588  2.617
Malaysia  -6.897 ***  2.785
Philippines  -4.868  2.516
Thailand  -3.319  2.652
Industry Dummies
Manufacturing  -0.457  0.717  -1.097 *  0.602
Transportation  -0.426  0.754  -0.736  0.668
Wholesale and Retail Trade  -0.467  0.761  -0.970  0.653
Services  -0.237  0.930  -0.916  0.793
Number of Observations  276  276
% Concordant  87.2%  81.9%Table 4
Summary Statistics (Means)  of Firms with Foreign  Debt in East Asia, 1996
This table reports  mean values for some of the variables  used in the subsequent  analysis. Firms  are separated  by hedgers  (derivative  users) and nonhedgers. Data are for 1996. Variables  are defined in detail
in the Appendix. Firms included in the sample  are those identified  by SBC Warburg Dillon Read as among  the largest in their respective  home countries. Aggregate measures  are provided for High Income
and Middle income countries (as defined  by the IMF) and for all countries. Chinese  "Red Chip" companies  are included  with Hong Kong Companies. Asterisks (**,  +,  *) denote statistical significance  at
the 1%,  5%, and 10%  level (respectively)  for a two-tailed Wilcoxon  two-sample  test.  Asterisks  are placed  next to the value that is significantly  larger.
Hedge  Obs.  Hedge  Foreign Debt  Sales  Debt-to-  Foreign  Foreign  Gross  Market-  Commit  Quick  Interest  Current
/ Total Debt  (USD  Assets  EBIT  Cash  Margin  to-Book  CapEx  Ratio  Coverage  Ratio
(1/6)  (1/()  millions)  (%/6)  (%)  (%)  / Sales
All Countries  No  97  0  58.7%  830.0  0.36  24.5% "  10.5%  21.4%  2.28  54.6%  1.39  3.01  2.07
(excl.  South  Korea)  Yes  70  66.5%  65.9%  **  1299.7  0.34  15.8%  23.0%  **  26.1%  *  2.50  38.6%  1.35  3.36  1.92
High Income  No  38  0  50.7%  986.6  0.30  28.3% '  9.6%  19.4%  1.88  40.3%  1.08  3.82  1.57
Yes  29  76.0%  54.0% '  2267.6  *  0.27  23.6%  29.4%  25.8% *  1.93  34.0%  1.26  4.65  **  1.42
Hong Kong/China  No  19  0  56.7%  880.1  0.33  **  27.4% '  9.5%  24.8%  1.72  58.8%  1.28  3.39  1.75
Yes  17  87.5%  49.1%  3081.5 *  0.24  8.8%  29.4%  ***  36.2%  1.69  48.1%  1.65  4.51  1.42
Singapore  No  8  0  56.2%  894.8  0.29  28.0%  14.9%  17.7%  2.09  9.1%  0.90  4.30  1.32
Yes  7  87.1%  68.6%  748.6  0.33  59.4%  50.4%  +  12.8%  2.01  10.3%  t  0.79  5.95  *  1.42 "
Taiwan  No  11  0  36.3%  1262.4  0.25  30.1%  6.0%  t  10.5%  1.99  29.9%  0.85  "  4.24  1.43
Yes  5  21.4%  50.4%  '  1627.1  0.27  24.0%  0.0%  8.3% '  2.63  19.6%  0.56  3.31  1.45
Middle Income  No  59  0  63.8%  731.9  0.39  22.0% '  11.1%  22.6%  2.54  63.5%  *  1.59  2.49  2.41
(excl.  South  Korea)  Yes  41  59.8%  74.4%  615.1  0.39  10.2%  18.5% *  26.2%  2.90  41.9%  1.42  2.45  2.30
Indonesia  No  21  0  73.8%  542.2  0.28  23.3%  '  14.9%  24.1%  2.03 **  51.7%  1.68 "  2.52  3.14 '
Yes  17  59.4%  86.4%  725.7  0.41 *  14.8%  26.7%  *  20.1%  2.34  23.7%  1.25  2.47  1.84
Malaysia  No  7  0  55.2%  *  1342.1  0.37  15.1%  10.9%  13.6%  1.95  27.4%  0.75  3.11  0.89
Yes  5  85.2%  33.4%  1063.4  0.41  '  6.0%  0.0%  31.5%  *  4.28  "  50.9%  2.03  '  2.14  *  2.27  "
Philippines  No  20  0  56.2%  599.2  0.48  15.2%  *  6.7%  27.9%  3.17  91.2%  1.96  2.79  2.51
Yes  4  62.5%  73.9%  372.2  0.28  0.0%  38.9%  50.8%  3.41*  34.9%  2.11  *  2.21  9.40
South Korea  No  35  0.0%  34.1%  6875.5  0.49  29.0%  10.0%  8.1%  0.93  11.0%  0.64  1.66  0.98
Yes  0  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA
Thailand  No  11  0  64.0%  946.8  0.44 '  36.2%  '  12.0%  15.7%  2.73  58.8%  1.38  1.51  1.88
Yes  15  51.1%  74.4% '  405.1  0.39  9.3%  9.8%  25.0%  *  2.93  61.2%  1.32  2.59  1.88Table 5
Determinants  of the Extent  of Hedging
Results are from TOBIT  regressions  with  the dependent  variable  equal  to the percentage  of foreign  debt  hedged  in 1996.
Coefficients  (Coef.)  and standard  errors (SE) are reported. Only firms  that had foreign  debt outstanding  are included  in
the estimation  since  the hedging  data are for foreign  debt. The dependent  variable  is censored  at 0% and 100%  (the
number  of firms in each group are reported  in the last two rows). Reported  p-values  are from a Wald  chi-squared  test
against  a null  of 0.0. Korean  firms are excluded  since  these companies  were forbidden  by law from using  derivatives  to
hedge foreign  debt. Foreign  Debt is the inverse  Mills  ratio from the LOGIT  estimation  in Column  (I) of Table  3. Other
independent  variables  are for 1996  and are defined  in detail in the Appendix. Asterisks  (***, *  *) denote  significance
in a two-tailed  test  at the 1%,  5%, and 10% level,  respectively.
Dependent Variable: Percent of Foreign Debt Hedged
(1)  (2)  (3)
Variable  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE  Coef  SE
Foreign EBIT(%)  -0.559 *  0.327  -0.663  **  0.330  -0.771  **  0.323
Foreign Cash (%)  0.808  **  0.367  0.307  0.390  0.041  0.340
Sales (log, USD)  0.058  0.090  -0.121  0.100  -0.148 *  0.091
Nondomestic Exchange (Dummy)  0.114  0.254  0.147  0.248  0.143  0.224
Foreign Debt / Total Debt  0.396  0.397  0.326  0.362  0.413  0.356
Debt-to-Assets  -0.965  1.010  -0.186  0.969  0.161  0.923
Gross Margin  1.907  *  0.570  1.673 *  0.584  1.435 ***  0.535
Market-to-Book  -0.081  0.136  0.027  0.134  0.065  0.127
Committed Capital Expenditures  -0.082  0.145  -0.194  0.176  -0.265 *  0.160
Quick Ratio  -0.137 ***  0.048  -0.092 **  0.044  -0.081  0.043
Market-to-Book * Debt-to-Assets  0.223  0.340  0.129  0.329  0.074  0.313
Intercept  -1.126  1.343  0.805  1.263
Control Variables
Foreign Debt (Inverse Mills Ratio)  0.135  0.503  0.843  0.724  1.297 **  0.533
Interest Rate Differential  -13.941 *  3.321
Country  Dummies
Hong Kong / China  0.562  1.341
Singapore  0.776  1.316
Taiwan  0.507  1.354
Indonesia  0.022  1.264
Malaysia  1.184  1.381
Philippines  -0.946  1.289
Thailand  0.552  1.271
Industry  Dummies
Manufacturing  0.133  0.354  0.011  0.339
Transportation  -0.520  0.379  -0.485  0.373
Wholesale and Retail Trade  0.722 **  0.370  0.581 *  0.357
Services  -0.868  0.543  -0.977 *  0.550
Nunber  of Observations  166  166  166
Left Censored  97  97  97
Right Censored  19  19  19Table  6
Comparison  of Hedgers and Nonhedgers
This table reports median values for differences between firms that hedge and firms that do not hedge for three variables: excess equity returns (first block), domestic equity betas (second
block), and exchange rate sensitivities (third block). Excess equity return is defined as the holding period return for each company in the sample minus the domestic market index holding
return.  Exchange rate sensitivities and domestic equity betas for each firm and sub-period are coefficients  from a linear regression  with weekly firm market returns as the dependent variable
and weekly domestic equity index return and percent changes in the domestic currency against the US Dollar as independent variables (corrected by standard errors).  Because these two
variables are highly collinear, domestic equity index returns are residuals from a regression of weekly percent changes in the domestic currency against the US Dollar on the domestic equity
index returns.  This orthogonalization  has little effect on the estimated equity betas and increases the explanatory power of exchange-rate changes.  See the Appendix for details.  The crisis
period is from June 28, 1997 to June 26, 1998. The post-crisis period is from June 27, 1996 to June 25, 1997, Each subperiod contains 52 weeks.  "Hedgers / Nonhedgers"  reports the number
of firms in each category.  Asterisks (***, '*,  *) denote significance in a two-tailed Wilcoxon two-sample test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Difference  in Median Excess  Equity  Return  D^wenee  in  Medin  Domsbc Equity  Beta  Dierence  In Medin  Exchange-Rate  Sidvkly
(Hedgers  -Nonhedgers)  (Hedgers  -Nonhedgers)  (Hedgers  -Nonhedgers)
Hedgers  /  Crisis  Post-Crisis  Crisis  Post-Crisis  Crisis  Post-Crisis
NonHedgers  Difference  (%)  p-val  Difference  (%)  p-val  Difference  p-val  Difference  p-val  Difference  p-val  Difference  p-val
All Finm  70/97  2.2%  0.569  13.9% "  0.040  -0.043  0.435  -0.024  0.857  -0.030  0.717  0.214  0.086
High Income  29 /38  1.2%  0.481  3.5%  0.179  -0.257  0.382  0.081  0.828  -0.169  0.869  0.426  0.196
Hong Kong/China  17/19  33.2%  0.204  21.2%  0.125  -0.322  0.797  0.006  0.573  -0.746  0.824  -0.568  0.443
Singapore  7/8  -4.5%  0.776  -25.5%  0.776  -0.098  0.909  -0.121  0,400  -0.077  0.909  -0.556  0.400
Taiwan  5/1I  0.7%  0.738  37.4%  0.161  -0.124  0.275  0.160  0.656  -0.122  0.507  1.624  '  0.016
Middle  Income  41/59  -9.7%  0:317  20.8%  '  0.074  0.028  0.941  -0.144  0.862  0.322  0.522  0.281  *  0.096
Indonesia  17/21  2.6%  0.751  18.3%  0.576  -0.315  0.225  0.013  0.391  0.397  0.497  0.474  0.273
Malaysia  5/7  1.4%  0.980  20.0%  0.636  0.202  0.873  -0.215  0.909  1.120  0.874  0.526  0.187
Philippines  4/20  -24.5%  0.242  30.1%  '  0.082  0.329  0.188  0.088  0.789  2.643  "  0.017  2.400  0.014
Thailand  15/11  -7.8%  0.309  -7.8%  0.359  0.172  0.386  -0.161  0.837  0.824  0.158  -0.176  0.474Table  7
Hedging and Market Returns
This  table  reports  results  from  OLS  regressions  with  firms'  excess  equity  returns  as the dependent  variables.  Excess
equity  return  is defined  as the holding  period  return  for  each company  in the sample  minus  the domestic  market  index
holding  return. The  first  set of coefficients  reports  results  from  a regression  using  equity  returns  for  the crisis  period
(June,  28 1997  to June  26, 1998).  The  second  set of coefficients  reports  results  from  a regression  using  equity  retums
for the  post-crisis  period  (June,  27 1998  to June  25, 1999).  Explanatory  variables  are defined  in detail  in  the
Appendix.  All  results  exclude  South  Korean  firms  because  they  were  prevented  by law from  hedging  foreign  debt.
Asterisks (***,  * *) denote significance in a two-tailed test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent  Variable:  Excess Equity Returns
(1)  (2)
Crisis  Post-Crisis
Variable  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE
Hedge (notional  value as % of total assets)  -0.527 *  0.296  1.421 *  0.766
Foreign EBIT (% total assets)  1.125 *  0.443  0.489  1.149
Foreign Cash (% total assets)  -0.070  0.070  -0.047  0.182
Debt-to-Assets  -0.084 *  0.028  0.035  0.074
Foreign Debt/ Total Debt  -0.128 **  0.066  -0.141  0.172
Exchange  Rate Sensitivity  -0.072  at**  0.013  0.064  *  0.034
Equity Beta  -0.302 *  0.042  -0.031  0.109
Change  in Sales (log-difference)  0.136 *  0.074  0.010  0.192
Change in Gross Margin  0.217  0.061  -0.152  0.157
Quick Ratio  0.014  0.013  -0.065 *  0.034
Sales (log,  US)  0.049 **  0.020  0.041  0.052
Nondomestic  Exchange (Dummy)  -0.118 **  0.056  0.169  0.146
Control Variables
Country  Dummies
Hong Kong  -0.192  0.329  -1.159  0.852
Singapore  -0.685  0.433  -0.612  1.121
Taiwan  -0.091  0.315  -1.089  0.817
Indonesia  -0.248  0.343  -1.154  0.889
Malaysia  -0.217  0.294  -0.885  0.763
Philippines  -0.385  0.355  -1.092  0.921
Thailand  -0.339  0.343  -0.863  0.888
Industry  Dummies
Manufacturing  0.079  0.076  0.156  0.197
Transportation  0.154  0.082  0.153  0.212
Wholesale  and Retail Trade  0.081  0.082  0.210  0.212
Services  0.048  0.097  0.227  0.251
Number  of Observations  253  246
Adjusted R 2 52.1%  7.9%Table  8
Hedging and Firm Performance
This table reports estimates from regressions with interest coverage and market-to-book as the dependent variables. The first column shows
results from an OLS specification  with changes in interest coverage from 1996 to 1998  as the dependent variable. The second assumes
interest coverage is a proxy for financial  distress and the dependent variable is set to a value of I if interest coverage is greater than 1.0. The
model is estimated using LOGIT.  The third colwnn reports results from an OLS specification with changes in market-to-book from 1996 to
1998 as the dependent  variable.  Independent variables are defined in detail in the Appendix. Asterisks (***,  , *) denote significance in a
two-tailed test at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)
OLS:  Dep.  Variable  =  LOGIT:  OLS:  Dep. Variable
Interest  Coverage  (1998)  Dependent  Variable  = I if  Market-to-Book  (1998)
- Interest  Coverage (1996)  Interest  Coverage 1998  >1  - Market-to-Book  (1996)
Variable  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE
Hedge (not. value as % of tot. assets)  4.532  3.130  -1.358  2.227  -2.353  2.798
Foreign  EBIT (% total assets)  4.266  4.731  4.416  5.258  4.666  4.230
Foreign Cash (% total assets)  0.465  0.747  1.140  3.532  -0.584  0.668
Debt-to-Assets  0.249  0.302  -0.487  0.233  0.520  0.270
Foreign Debt (%)  -1.929  0.718  -1.240  0.557  0.908  0.642
Change in Sales  (log-difference)  0.829  0.410  0.463  0.311  -0.124  0.367
Change in Gross Margin  -0.424  0.567  0.789  0.605  -0.467  0.507
Nondomestic  Exchange (Dummy)  0.657  0.605  -0.243  0.446  0.083  0.541
Control  Variables
Country  Dummies
Hong Kong  / China  -1.877  *  0.899  1.844  *  0.739  -1.776  0.804
Singapore  -2.617 '#  1.017  0.294  0.765  0.156  0.909
Taiwan  -3.291 *  0.939  0.569  0.691  -2.733 *  0.839
Indonesia  -2.647  *  1.045  2.637  t*'  0.984  -3.637  *  0.935
Malaysia  -2.479  0.927  0.589  0.701  -1.600 **  0.829
Philippines  -2.601  0.966  0.294  0.707  -0.900  0.864
Thailand  -0.603  0.992  1.863  0.769  -1.976 **  0.887
Industry Dummies
Manufacturing  0.584  0.829  0.786  0.634  0.514  0.741
Transportation  0.688  0.884  0.417  0.673  0.435  0.790
Wholesale  and Retail  Trade  0.387  0.868  0.201  0.661  1.152  0.776
Services  0.583  1.050  0.260  0.773  0.535  0.939
Nurnber  of Observations  242  242  242
Adjusted R 2 /% Concordant  29.1%  74.8%  13.9%Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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